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Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is a special case of mobile networks, where vehicles equipped 
with computing/communicating devices (called “smart vehicles”) are the mobile wireless nodes. 
However, the movement pattern of these mobile wireless nodes is no more random, as in case of 
mobile networks, rather it is restricted to roads and streets. Vehicular networks have hybrid 
architecture; it is a combination of both infrastructure and infrastructure-less architectures. The 
direct vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication is infrastructure-less or ad hoc in nature. Here the 
vehicles traveling within communication range of each other form an ad hoc network. On the other 
hand, the vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication has infrastructure architecture where 
vehicles connect to access points deployed along roads. These access points are known as road side 
units (RSUs) and vehicles communicate with other vehicles/wired nodes through these RSUs. To 
provide various services to vehicles, RSUs are generally connected to each other and to the Internet. 
The direct RSU to RSU communication is also referred as I2I communication.  
The success of VANET depends on the existence of pervasive roadside infrastructure and sufficient 
number of smart vehicles. Most VANET applications and services are based on either one or both 
of these requirements. A fully matured VANET will have pervasive roadside network and enough 
vehicle density to enable VANET applications. However, the initial deployment stage of VANET 
will be characterized by the lack of pervasive roadside infrastructure and low market penetration of 
smart vehicles. It will be economically infeasible to initially install a pervasive and fully networked 
iv 
roadside infrastructure, which could result in the failure of applications and services that depend on 
V2I or I2I communications. Further, low market penetration means there are insufficient number of 
smart vehicles to enable V2V communication, which could result in failure of services and 
applications that depend on V2V communications. Non-availability of pervasive connectivity to 
certification authorities and dynamic locations of each vehicle will make it difficult and expensive to 
implement security solutions that are based on some central certificate management authority. Non-
availability of pervasive connectivity will also affect the backend connectivity of vehicles to the 
Internet or the rest of the world.  
Due to economic considerations, the installation of roadside infrastructure will take a long time and 
will be incremental thus resulting in a heterogeneous infrastructure with non-consistent capabilities. 
Similarly, smart vehicles will also have varying degree of capabilities. This will result in failure of 
applications and services that have very strict requirements on V2I or V2V communications.  
We have proposed several solutions to overcome the challenges described above that will be faced 
during the initial deployment stage of VANET. Specifically, we have proposed: 
 A VANET architecture that can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous 
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities. 
 A backend connectivity solution that provides connectivity between the Internet and smart 
vehicles without requiring pervasive roadside infrastructure or large number of smart 
vehicles. 
 A security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or a fully 
connected V2V network and fulfills all the security requirements.  
v 
 Optimization solutions for placement of a limited number of RSUs within a given area to 
provide best possible service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solutions cover both 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview: Vehicular Networks 
Wireless Networks can have infrastructure or infrastructure-less architecture. In infrastructure 
wireless networks, wireless nodes communicate with other wireless/wired nodes through an access 
point (AP) and no direct communication takes place between the wireless nodes. Whereas, in 
infrastructure-less wireless networks, there is no AP and wireless nodes communicate with other 
wireless nodes directly. The infrastructure-less wireless network is also known as ad hoc network or 
mobile ad hoc network (MANET) since the wireless nodes are usually mobile. Vehicles when 
equipped with computing/communicating devices (or On-Board Units - OBUs) also become mobile 
wireless nodes (sometimes referred as “smart car(s)” or “smart vehicle(s)”) and the network 
becomes Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). Vehicular networks are a special case of mobile 
networks; the movement pattern of mobile wireless nodes is no more random rather it is restricted 
to roads and streets.  
Vehicular networks have hybrid architecture; it is a combination of both infrastructure and 
infrastructure-less architectures. The direct vehicle to vehicle communication commonly referred as 
V2V communication is infrastructure-less or ad hoc in nature. Here the vehicles traveling within 
communication range of each other form an ad hoc network. Whereas the vehicle to infrastructure 
communication also referred as V2I communication has infrastructure architecture. The vehicles 
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connect to access points deployed along the road. These access points are known as road side units 
(RSUs) and vehicles communicate with other vehicles/wired nodes through these RSUs. To provide 
various services to vehicles, RSUs are generally connected to other RSUs and to the Internet (like a 
distribution system in IEEE 802.11 architecture [1]). The direct RSU to RSU communication is also 
referred as I2I communication. An example of a VANET is shown in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Vehicular ad hoc network - VANET 
The architectural components of VANET include vehicles, roadside units (RSUs), I2I network, 
back-end connection of I2I network to Internet and some kind of management authority. The 
communication components of VANET include V2V communication, V2I or I2V communication 
and I2I communication. V2V and V2I communications complement each other. A pervasive RSU 
deployment with an elaborate I2I network will provide pervasive V2I communication that can 
3 
provide a service without any need of V2V communication. And on the other hand, a fully 
connected V2V network can overcome the absence of an elaborate V2I communication. 
The nodes in VANET are highly mobile as compared to that of MANET but the mobility is 
restricted to roads/streets and is also affected by traffic conditions. The traffic conditions vary both 
temporarily and spatially. These characteristics result in highly dynamic network topology with 
frequent connections/disconnections. The presence of buildings and other manmade architectures 
alongside roads restrict the communication direction and range. The connection times are therefore 
very short due to high node mobility and existence of these obstacles. Vehicles tend to move in 
packets with large gaps between packets thus resulting in disconnected networks. As compared to 
MANET, VANET does not suffer from limitation of power and storage. As compared to other 
wireless/wired networks the applications and services of VANET are strongly related to location. 
Efforts for standardization of vehicular communications/networks have long been done by 
different standard organizations such as International Standard Organization (ISO), European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
(IEEE). ISO’s TC 204 WG 16 (Technical Committee 204 Working Group 16) is handling the 
standardization initiative and is called CALM (started as “Communications, Air-interface, Long and 
Medium range” and is now “"Communications Access for Land Mobiles”) [2]. ETSI’s TC ITS 
(Technical Committee on Intelligent Transportation Systems) has five Working Groups (WG1-5) 
working in this direction [3].  IEEE’s 1609 WG (Dedicated Short Range Communication Working 
Group) is working to develop IEEE 1609 family of standards for vehicular networks also referred as 
WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments) [4]. IEEE 1609 family of standard includes 
4 
IEEE 1609.0,1,2,3,4, IEEE 1609.11 and IEEE 802.11p [5-11]. IEEE 802.11p [11] amends IEEE 
802.11 [12] for access in vehicular environments and is based on Dedicated Short Range 
Communications (DSRC) [12]. The relationship among WAVE Model and OSI Model is shown in 
Figure 1.2 [13]. 
 
Figure 1.2: Relationship among WAVE Standards Family 
1.2 Motivation 
The success of VANET depends on existence of pervasive roadside infrastructure and sufficient 
number of smart vehicles. Most of the VANET applications and services are based on either one or 
both of these requirements. Initial deployment stage of VANET will be characterized by lack of 
pervasive roadside infrastructure and low market penetration of smart vehicles. 
It will not be economically feasible to initially install a pervasive and fully networked roadside 
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services and applications that depend on this type of communication. The lack of infrastructure will 
remain a reality in rural areas and along highways even after the initial deployment stage. Further, 
backend connectivity will also remain an issue in rural areas and along highways even after the initial 
deployment stage of VANET. 
Low market penetration will result in insufficient number of smart vehicles to enable V2V 
communication, thus causing failure of services and applications that depend on V2V 
communications (such as accidents report) [14]. Low density of smart vehicles will reduce the 
connection time between vehicles [15]. Low density of smart vehicles will also result in sparse and 
disconnected networks.  
Expensive installation and maintenance of roadside infrastructure will make the services expensive 
to users, thus reducing the rate of market penetration that in turn will make investment in 
infrastructure further unattractive for service providers. There will be a need to optimally place the 
limited number of roadside units to provide best service to smart vehicles. 
During the initial deployment stage, due to non-availability of pervasive connectivity to certification 
authorities and dynamic locations of each vehicle, it will be difficult and expensive to have security 
solutions based on some central certificate management authority. 
Due to economical considerations the installation of roadside infrastructure will take a long time and 
will be incremental thus resulting in a heterogeneous infrastructure with non-consistent capabilities. 
6 
Similarly, smart vehicles will also have varying degree of capabilities. This will result in failure of 
applications and services that have very strict requirements on V2I or V2V communications.  
1.3 Proposed Work and Contributions 
The proposed work is to overcome the challenges that will be faced during initial deployment stage 
of VANET. The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below.  
 Design of a VANET architecture that does not need expensive roadside infrastructure or 
large number of smart vehicles, can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous 
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities, is scalable and deployable. 
 Provision of backend connectivity to Internet to smart vehicles without requiring pervasive 
roadside infrastructure or large number of smart vehicles, especially in rural areas and along 
highways. 
 Design of security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or 
a fully connected V2V network. The architecture is economical, scalable and deployable. 
 Optimal placement of limited number of RSUs within a given area to provide best possible 
service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solution covers both environments: the 
urban areas and the highways. 
1.4 Organization of Dissertation 
Remainder of dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives the design of an economical and 
deployable VANET architecture. Chapter 3 presents a backend connectivity solution using satellite 
7 
receive only terminals. Chapter 4 discusses security architecture for VANET initial deployment 
stage. Chapter 5 presents solutions for optimal placement of limited number of RSUs in two distinct 
environments; along highways and in urban areas. Finally, Chapter 6 gives the conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 AN ECONOMICAL AND DEPLOYABLE VANET 
Although there is plenty of research on VANET, the solutions to the challenges existing during the 
long transition period in VANET deployment are largely ignored. There are some research solutions 
that offset the absence of roadside architecture by either not relying on it (i.e., using only V2V 
communication), or using cellular architecture, or using existing available Wi-Fi hotspots, or using 
static/mobile relay units (Delay tolerant networks) [9, 10, 12, 16, 18, 24]. Most of these approaches 
target specific applications and may not be easily upgradable (during later stages) to VANET 
architecture (such as those defined by IEEE P1609 working group). There is also lack of research 
on how to provide incentive for vehicle owners to install wireless devices, especially when support 
from roadside infrastructure is insufficient and very limited number of smart vehicles are on the 
road.  
We present an economical and deployable VANET system design to solve these challenges. Our 
focus is to provide a transitional/interim solution that can be used to start up (or give impetus) to 
VANET activities, during the long initial transition period, by making VANET easy to deploy, 
secure and economical. At the same time the design should be incremental/progressive and should 
be easily transformed into architectures that are already specified in VANET standards/protocols 
without requiring any major revamp/modifications. From now on we will mostly refer “smart 
vehicles” as “vehicles” without considering any vehicle that has no communication device, unless 
there is a need to explicitly mention smart vehicles. 
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The contribution of this solution is a VANET system design, for the long initial transition period, 
that is economical, realistic, incremental and deployable. Core component in our design, the 
Roadside Units (RSUs), can be standalone with minimum intelligence in their basic form. Our 
proposed design does not require RSUs to be interconnected or connected to the Internet. We 
present a basic protocol that makes the communication between roadside units possible via mobile 
vehicles. The simulation results indicate considerable performance gains by just using standalone 
RSUs. 
The chapter is organized in five sections. In section 2.1 presents related work. Section 2.2 gives 
detailed description of our proposed design. Section 2.3 presents the simulation details. Section 2.4 
presents discussion and section 2.5 gives the conclusion. 
2.1 Related Works 
Most of the existing research in VANET presents routing algorithms for V2V communication [2-4]; 
these protocols rely on the assumption that sufficient number of vehicles will be available for 
relaying messages. Some of the research work also addresses the routing in disconnected or 
intermittently connected networks [5-7]. A hybrid approach has also been presented to address 
limited connection time between vehicles [8]. However, during the initial deployment there will not 
be sufficient number of smart vehicles on the road to even form small clusters for these protocols to 
work. Further, lack of roadside infrastructure will make use of hybrid protocols difficult. 
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The technique for transmission of data between nodes of a disconnected or partitioned network 
using temporary storage at intermediate nodes is a delay tolerant network (DTN) [9]. Besides 
satellite networks, the concept of DTN has been widely applied to VANET (which may be 
considered as DTN especially during initial deployment stages) [5, 9-13]. It is pertinent to highlight 
here that most of the existing research in this context is on V2V communication protocols [5, 10, 
11] where mobile nodes temporarily store the message if no route is available and later 
opportunistically forward the message. These protocols may be used to solve the disconnected 
network problem due to uneven distribution of traffic, but may not be an effective solution to low 
penetration rate issues. Throwboxes in UMass’ DieselNet [12] are similar to our standalone RSUs. 
The throwboxes act as stationary routers to improve connectivity among mobile nodes (buses) that 
are equipped with multiple radios (including a long-range radio), GPS recording devices etc. In our 
research the RSUs are not just the routers, but in addition they also receive, process and disseminate 
information (such as safety or warning). Mobile nodes in MIT’s CarTel [13] are equipped with 
multiple sensors; the data collected from these sensors is processed and transferred to a central 
portal by these nodes. The transfer is accomplished opportunistically via Wi-Fi (hotspots, roadside 
units), Bluetooth or by nodes themselves (data mules). A specially designed delay-tolerant network 
stack (CafNet) is used for communication. Our emphasis is not on making major modification to 
existing VANET standards/protocols, but to enable their gradual/incremental deployment during 
initial phases.  
Infostations architecture allows use of high speed and generally dispersed access points. The access 
points/stations afford transfer of high volume of data at cost of connectivity. They can be especially 
useful in VANET environment where vehicles are moving at fast speeds and connection time to 
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access points is very limited [14, 15]. This architecture cannot solve the low penetration problem 
since the infostations will generally be widely dispersed. Further, these must also be fully networked 
with Internet, which will be expensive to install and maintain. 
A number of researches have incorporated cellular networks in VANET [16-19]. Cellular networks 
are mostly used as a backbone - a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Cellular networks, though 
pervasive, offer lower data rates as compared to Wi-Fi (roadside infrastructure). Although with the 
advent of 3G/4G technologies data rates close to broadband can be achieved, these technologies are 
not uniformly available throughout cellular coverage areas and many users are still dependent on 
other heterogeneous technologies (WAP, GPRS, EDGE, HSDPA, etc [20]). Further, cellular data 
plans subscriptions are expensive; an unconstrained plan with a 5GB/month limit costs 
approximately $700/year. 5GB/month means per day a user on average can send/receive 50 emails 
(20 with attachments), download a song and a game/app, view 40 web pages, posts 10 social media 
posts with photos, and watch a streaming video of 40 minutes [21]. Although unlimited data plans 
and those that cost few ten of dollars are also available, but these have several fine print conditions; 
such as ‘usage patterns’ (no file sharing, excessive usage, etc), ‘can only be used on smart phones’ 
(no tethering), ‘can only access certain service’ (email, predefined websites, etc), and ‘must have a 
qualifying voice plan’. Some service providers are charging approximately $2/MB or 1¢/KB for web 
browsing. All major cellular service providers are now offering and encouraging users (such as 
offering ‘unlimited Wi-Fi usage with data plan’) to access data through hotspots (which use Wi-Fi 
just like VANET roadside infrastructure instead of 3G/4G). This also highlights cost/benefit of Wi-
Fi over 3G/4G. In addition cellular networks also have few other disadvantages such as expensive 
to built/maintain, billing/licensing issues among different service providers, higher roaming rates, 
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large and variable latency, central switching/resource management, difficult to scale and occasional 
blackouts [20, 22-27]. 
A class of protocols uses the store-and-forward approach for V2V communications [2, 28]. MDDV 
[2] is a multi-hop V2V protocol. It uses predictability of vehicle movement to route the messages. It 
assumes the vehicles to be equipped with GPS and digital maps. It uses trajectory and geographical 
based forwarding. If end-to-end path does not exist then messages are stored and later forwarded 
when a connection is established. VADD [28] is also a multi-hop protocol using the carry-and-
forward paradigm. In this protocol a vehicle carries a message until it finds another vehicle in 
communication range, then it forwards the message. It assumes that the vehicles are equipped with 
GPS, digital maps and also have detailed traffic statistics such as vehicle density, vehicle speeds. It 
bases its decision of message-forwarding on these statistics. Both the protocols [2, 28] are used to 
transfer messages between vehicles in multi hops. 
Lochert et al. [29] compare the performance of standalone and networked stationary supporting 
units (SSU) in context of low penetration rate. The work focuses on dissemination of information 
from a central point in a city scenario. They show that the networked SSUs (connected via a 
backbone) improve the performance dramatically as opposed to the standalone SSUs. V2V 
communication also plays an important part in their scenario. Whereas in our case we used very 
limited penetration rate so that V2V communication is not possible and our results show that 
standalone RSUs do increase the performance. 
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Our work comes closer to protocols that use vehicles to transfer messages between roadside units 
[30-33]. M.C. Chuah et al. [32] present a protocol using multi-hop V2V communication between 
roadside units. They present a detailed mechanism for forwarding of messages at each hop. It makes 
use of query and response messages at each hop. B. Petit et al. [30] present a set of protocols for 
data relaying between roadside units using vehicles. The protocols give different options for transfer 
of data between a source/sink and a vehicle. It uses solicit and beacons for selection of appropriate 
vehicle to carry the data. The work has been further extended by A. Mansey et al. [33] giving vehicle-
roadside unit data transfer mechanisms and reliable multi-packet data transfer schemes. The 
protocol does not provide details on routing between different roadside units. Y. Ding et al. [31] 
present a static node assisted adaptive routing protocol. It is basically a multi hop protocol that 
makes use of static nodes at the intersection to store and forward the messages, thus improving 
performance over other multi hop V2V communication protocols. 
Our research work differs from above mentioned protocols in many ways. We do not assume 
vehicles to be equipped with GPS and digital map, or have road statistical data, which makes our 
design more realistic especially in the initial transition period. Our design does not involve V2V 
communication, thus it works well when smart vehicles are sparsely distributed on roads. We do not 
assume roadside units to be always connected to infrastructure (i.e., fully networked or connected to 
the Internet), which makes the RSU deployment in our design economical and practical during the 
transition stage. We present an integrated design involving vehicles and roadside units with varying 
degree of capabilities. Besides being economical, the design is also scalable and can easily be 
upgraded without any major modifications in protocol.  
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2.2 Proposed Design 
The common characteristic of all VANET applications is either collection or dissemination of 
information from/to vehicles in a timely and efficient manner. V2V and V2I communications 
complement each other in achieving this flow of information. For example, we can overcome the 
issue of low market penetration of smart vehicles by having more elaborate roadside infrastructure 
(i.e., passing information through fully networked roadside units or using infrastructure to 
infrastructure – I2I communication), or conversely, high penetration can overcome lack of roadside 
infrastructure or I2I communication (i.e., passing information using V2V communication). As 
discussed earlier, during the initial stage of VANET, both V2I (also I2I) and V2V communications 
will not be very effective. So we need to address the issues of V2V and V2I connectivity in an 
efficient and economical way. Since we cannot influence the market penetration of smart vehicles, 
the other solution is to improve V2I and I2I communications; which will, in turn, complement the 
lack of V2V communication. One option is to have pervasive fully networked roadside 
infrastructure (to improve V2I and I2I communications). Though it may be possible to have such a 
network in urban-areas but in rural-areas/along-highways (where there is not much manmade 
infrastructure) this option will be quite expensive and impractical. Another option is to use cellular 
network as a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Though cellular networks are pervasive, but in 
addition to the technical and economical disadvantages mentioned earlier in section 2.1, this option 
will also introduce heterogeneous technologies (i.e., typical VANET architecture in urban-areas and 
cellular based architecture in rural-areas/along-highways); making the transition to final VANET 
architecture difficult.  
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We suggest improving connectivity/communication by using roadside units (RSUs). In its basic 
form our proposed RSU is standalone with only store-and-forward capability, which makes it 
economical and easy to install/maintain, especially in rural-areas or along highways. Other types of 
RSUs include those that are locally connected to each other or connected to the Internet (those 
located close to manmade infrastructure or in urban-areas). Details of RSU design are given in 
Section 4.1. An overview of RSU’s role in achieving different connectivity requirements is given 
below: 
 V2V Communication: Direct multi-hop V2V communication will not be possible during 
initial deployment phases due to low market penetration. V2V communication among 
vehicles with temporal displacement will be improved using store-and-forward capability of 
RSUs and those with spatial displacement will be improved if RSUs are networked. Besides 
broadcast communication, one-to-one communication among temporally displaced vehicles 
may also be achieved with the support from RSUs if vehicles have fixed routes and travel 
schedules (as in the case of daily commute).  
 V2I Communication: Economical and easy installation/maintenance features of RSUs help 
in achieving high RSU densities even in rural areas and along highways; this will help in 
improving V2I communication.  
 I2I Communication: V2I communication is of little use if there is no I2I communication. 
RSUs that are connected to each other or to the Internet can easily communicate with each 
other. Standalone RSUs can use passing-by vehicles as relays to communicate with each 
other.  
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Our design integrates RSUs of varying capabilities thus making architecture economical, easy to 
install/maintain, incremental/progressive (basic RSUs can easily be upgraded to higher capability 
ones), homogenous (same technology in urban and rural areas) and upgradable to final VANET 
architecture. 
2.2.1 Roadside Unit - RSU 
The motivation of our design is to make roadside units light weight, simple/easy to install and 
economical. Our proposed design does not require all RSUs to have the same capabilities. Multiple 
versions of RSUs enable engineers to have necessary flexibility in designing a VANET architecture 
that is suitable to their requirements and budget.  
2.2.1.1 Multiple Versions 
We define several different versions of RSUs with varying capabilities/functions and network 
connectivity. In its basic version, an RSU is a standalone unit with temporary store-and-forward 
capability. In terms of connectivity, RSUs can be standalone, locally networked (via wire or wireless 
such as WiMax [44]), connected to the Internet via wire or wireless, or just have backend receiver-
only capability in order to receive data from satellite, cellular, commercial radio, etc. RSUs may have 
sensors for monitoring local weather, road condition, traffic, etc. All RSUs are tamper proof, capable 
of receiving and sending data from/to vehicles and have some information processing capabilities. 
Possible versions of RSUs are listed in Table 2.1. A possible architecture with standalone, locally 
connected and globally connected RSUs is shown in Figure 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Different version of RSUs with increasing functionality. An RSU with a larger version 
number will be more expensive but provide more functionality. 






















1.0  Yes  No  No  No  No  No  
1.1  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  
1.2  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  
2.0  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No  
2.1  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  
2.2  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  
3.0  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  
3.1  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  -  Yes  
Store-and-forward is the basic capability and enables an RSU to transfer messages between spatially 
and temporally displaced vehicles. Intelligent information processing gives RSUs the capability of 
encryption/decryption, data verification, provision of time/location stamp, certificate revocation, 
etc. Sensors are used to collect local traffic and weather data. This collected data can be used for 
verification of data provided by vehicles. Limited local connectivity means an RSU is connected to 
at least one adjacent RSU. “Backend receive only” enables reception of critical safety information, 
certification revocation lists, etc. It is an economical way to receive important non-local messages 
for dissemination to vehicles in an area, such as fire, flood, and earthquake emergency warnings. It 
can also be used for distribution of certificate revocation lists to RSUs similar to [34]. “Backend 
duplex connectivity” means connection to the Internet; such RSU can send and receive data 
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to/from the Internet. Other RSUs can connect to the Internet through the backend duplex 
connected RSUs.  
 
Figure 2.1: The proposed architecture consists of RSUs deployed along the roads. RSUs can be 
standalone (the three RSUs on top right), locally connected to adjacent RSU (two on the top-left 
corner), or connected to Internet infrastructure (three on the bottom). What versions of RSUs to 
install depends on overall budget and services we want to provide. 
2.2.1.2 Deployment 
Different versions of RSUs help in achieving economical deployment across diverse areas. In urban 
areas where Internet connectivity is pervasive, it is economical and easy to deploy Internet 
connected RSUs, whereas in rural areas or along highways where it is difficult/expensive to extend 





cellular network), it is more economical to deploy standalone or locally networked RSUs. These 
basic standalone RSUs will help in getting VANET started and later they may be replaced with more 
advanced ones without any system overhaul. 
Each RSU will have a distinct identification and an associated digital certificate. The certificate 
issuing authorities for RSU’s certificates may be organized on area/region basis. All vehicles in 
VANET will have certificate-issuing-authority’s certificate and will be capable of verifying RSUs’ 
certificates and messages signed by these certificates. At startup, a VANET can even have Version 
1.0 RSUs without any certificates. These RSUs can be used for only store-and-forward functions and 
be deployed at non-critical locations. 
Each RSU will be aware of local map, its own location and locations of other RSUs in the area. 
Additionally, each RSU will also maintain a routing table with known path to each of the other RSUs 
in the area. Initially, this information will be added at the time of installation and later it will be 
updated periodically via RSU update messages. For this purpose, each RSU will periodically 
exchange signed Hello messages (containing routing table etc) with its neighbors. Routing-table-
update procedures from any existing table-driven routing protocol may be employed for routing 
table updates and the details are hence omitted here. Routing between standalone RSUs relies on the 
relay by passing-by vehicles and is directly related to traffic density. If traffic density varies 
considerably during different times of day then the routing table may contain multiple entries 
accordingly (e.g., one each for morning commutes, one for evening commutes, and one for rest of 
the day). 
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2.2.2 V2V Communication 
V2V communication is an important part of VANET; many VANET applications (such as 
cooperative driving, and safety warnings) depend on V2V communications. However, there will be a 
very small number of smart vehicles during the initial deployment phase of VANET and V2V 
communication will hardly exist. In such case standalone RSUs (with store-and-forward capability) 
can play an important role in achieving limited V2V communication. A sending vehicle sends a 
message to a nearby RSU, which stores and later forwards it to another passing-by recipient vehicle. 
Though this type of communication cannot be used for time-critical messages but it can still serve as 
a means to broadcast non-time-critical messages. If a vehicle has its certificate then it may also sign 
the message to ensure its authenticity to a receiver. In this way, a malicious vehicle transferring fake 
messages will be held accountable. 
If an RSU is networked (locally or with Internet), then the RSU can support V2V communication 
between spatially displaced vehicles. This could be useful in quick dissemination of information 
within the network or across networks (if the RSU is connected to the Internet). 
2.2.3 V2I (Vehicle to RSU) Communication 
Our proposed design enables service providers to deploy a relatively large number of RSUs with less 
investment thus enabling more V2I communications. Each RSU will advertise its existence and 
offered services by broadcasting periodical beacons. The services offered by a particular RSU will 
depend on its version/capabilities, e.g., an Internet connected RSU may offer email service whereas 
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a standalone RSU may only offer store-and-forward service. If an RSU is capable of sensing nearby 
vehicles, it can broadcast its beacon only when a vehicle enters its broadcast range ─ this conserves 
power in low traffic conditions. The beacon broadcasting interval (BI) can be defined by the 
maximum allowed driving speed (s) and broadcast zone diameter (Zd), i.e., BI = Zd /s. 
The beacon will include an RSU’s ID, certificate, location, current time, location of adjacent RSUs, 
services offered and critical safety information. Critical safety information is included in beacon to 
reduce the information relaying time. The beacon message will be signed by its issuing RSU. Critical 
safety information messages may also be broadcasted independent of the beacons. In this case, 
critical safety messages will be given priority over other messages. They will be signed by sending 
RSUs and will include location of sending RSUs and current time. Vehicles may relay these messages 
to other passing-by vehicles.  
2.2.4 I2I (RSU to RSU) Communication 
I2I communication plays a vital role in both V2V and V2I communications. I2I communication may 
be considered a part of V2I communication especially when roadside infrastructure is fully 
networked. We consider I2I communication separately because in the initial deployment stage of 
VANET, RSUs are not necessarily connected to each other or to the Internet. Data transmission 
will normally be limited to adjacent RSUs only. However, there may be situations when a message is 
needed to be sent to another RSU that is many hops away, such as sending information about a 
malicious vehicle to an RSU that is known to be connected to the Internet, or relaying an accident 
report to emergency vehicle that is known to be located near a particular RSU. 
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I2I communication, depending on the connectivity of RSUs, can be divided into two types, i.e., I2I 
Direct communication and I2I Indirect communication, which will be introduced next. 
2.2.4.1 I2I (RSU to RSU) Direct Communication 
Some RSUs may be locally connected to adjacent ones. This connectivity can be wired or wireless. 
Local connectivity is economical as compared to global connectivity (to the Internet). If two RSUs 
are connected to each other then direct I2I communication will be used. For this, existing protocols 
(such as those defined by IEEE P1609 working group) may be used, and the details are hence 
omitted. There may be a case where part of networking route is connected and part is disconnected; 
the connected part will use direct communication whereas the disconnected part will use indirect 
communication introduced in the following. 
2.2.4.2 I2I (RSU to RSU) Indirect Communication (via Vehicles) 
If RSUs are not locally connected, then the RSUs communicate with each other using passing-by 
vehicles. A reputation system may be used to solicit vehicles’ cooperation in relaying these messages. 
The exact details of such a reputation system are out of the scope and are not discussed. The 
addressing information will include the destination RSU’s ID and its location. If the message is for 
an RSU that is several hops away then routing information will also be included. Routing 
information will include locations and IDs of all intermediate RSUs along the path to the destination 
RSU. The message will be signed by its originator and any confidential information will be 
encrypted. The certificate of the originator will also be appended with the message. 
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The basic idea of opportunistic routing is used in our design. In opportunistic routing, as opposed to 
deterministic routing, the node that forwards a message is not predetermined. It is determined on 
the fly, normally by a subset of nodes that receive the broadcast [45, 46]. An RSU broadcasts a 
message to every vehicle in range. There are two possible options for the selection of relaying 
vehicle. In the first option, after receiving the message, each vehicle waits for a random amount of 
time and then acknowledges the message. On hearing the acknowledgement sent by one vehicle all 
other vehicles will discard the message. Therefore, only one vehicle that acknowledges first is 
selected as the message-relay-vehicle.  
One possible problem can occur for this option when the relaying vehicle diverts from the route 
before delivering the message. In this case the probability of success can be increased by letting 
more than one vehicle to relay the message. Another possible issue is the hidden-node problem 
(note that the small number of smart vehicles during the initial stage of VANET deployment will 
reduce the chances of having a hidden-node); in this case more than one vehicle will acknowledge 
and carry the message. This operation will provide redundancy to the protocol, but at the same time, 
it will require duplicate suppression at the destination. (Mathematical analysis of the number of 
nodes required to deliver a message with certain probability of confidence is discussed later).  
Acknowledgement messages will be restricted to only one hop. End-to-end acknowledgement may 
be included as an optional service. The calculation of acknowledgement timeout is discussed later. 
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2.2.4.2.1 Operation 
When an RSU broadcasts a message, each receiving vehicle compares the destination location with 
its direction of travel and discards the message if it is for an RSU on the opposite direction. For a 
vehicle not equipped with GPS, we have two options to determine its direction of travel relative to 
the location of destination RSU. First, the vehicle can use the location of RSU it has just passed and 
the location of current RSU to determine its direction of travel. Second, in the message the sending-
RSU can include the previous-RSU’s ID that a vehicle must have passed, if it is along the desired 
direction. 
A relaying vehicle passes the message to each intermediate RSU that is listed in the routing path of 
the message. When an RSU receives a message, it checks message integrity and then sends an 
acknowledgement to its immediate upstream RSU according to the routing information contained in 
the message. If the message has been received before, it is discarded and only the acknowledgement 
is sent. This ensures duplicate elimination on a per hop basis. 
If the message receiving RSU is not the destination RSU, it rebroadcasts the message to the next 
RSU in the routing path. It then waits for an acknowledgment from the next RSU; waiting time is 
defined by acknowledgement-wait-time (details in next section). If no acknowledgement is received 
till the expiration of acknowledgement-wait-time, it rebroadcasts the message. The process is then 
repeated for a fixed number of times. This guards against network overloading since there may be 
the cases when a message has been received but acknowledgement cannot be sent due to lack of 
upstream vehicular traffic. The acknowledgement generated by the destination RSU may be sent 
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back to the source RSU as an optional service. An example flow of message and its 
acknowledgements is shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.2: Flow of a message and its acknowledgement between RSU1 and RSU4 (illustrated also in 
Figure 2.3). Message M1 is sent from RSU1 to RSU4 via RSU2 and RSU3. ti represents time in order. 
Ri represents RSUi. Vi represents vehicle i that carries a message. AckRi is the acknowledgement 
message from RSUi to RSUi-1. 
A vehicle may deliver the same message to more than one consecutive RSUs, for example, in Figure 
2.2 and 2.3, vehicle V2 delivers message M1 to RSU2 and RSU3. In order to take advantage of this 
situation, each receiving RSU waits for acknowledgement from its next RSU on the routing path 
before re-broadcasting the message, since the vehicle that has delivered the message may also deliver 
the message to the next RSU. But if the traffic density is low, the receiving RSU may rebroadcast the 
message before the end of the wait timer (to simplify the logic the RSU may rebroadcast the 
message before starting the wait timer). 
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Figure 2.3: Snapshots of the road conditions when a message is sent from RSU1 to RSU4 via 
RSU2 and RSU3 (illustrated also in Figure 2). (a) V1 and V2 receive the message from RSU1. (b) V1 
and V2 deliver the message to RSU2, V1 diverts to its right at road junction, V3 and V4 approach 
RSU2. (c) V2 delivers the message to RSU3, V3 receives the message from RSU2, V4 carries the 
acknowledgement message from RSU2 for RSU1. (d) V3 delivers the message to RSU4, V5 approaches 
RSU3. (e) V6 receives the acknowledgement message from RSU4 for RSU3; V5 carries the 
acknowledgement message from RSU3 for RSU2. (f) The acknowledgement messages delivered by 


















































2.2.4.2.2 Acknowledgement Wait Time 
Each RSU waits for its acknowledgement before retransmitting. The wait time (Wt) depends on the 
distance to the next RSU, the average speed of vehicles and traffic conditions. It is directly related to 






2  (2.1) 
Where   is a constant which caters for processing done at a node before sending the 
acknowledgement.  
The final wait time will be estimated using equation 2.3. Here   is the smoothing factor, M  is the 
acknowledgement arrival time and D  is the smoothed deviation (similar to TCP round-trip-time 
estimation model [47]) 
  MWDD t   1  (2.2) 
TimeOut DWt  4  (2.3) 
2.2.4.2.3 Number of Relay Vehicles 
We cannot be sure that a vehicle which has passed the source RSU and is carrying the message will 
always pass the destination RSU without diverting on the way. Therefore, we want to estimate the 
number of times a source should relay the message to have some degree of confidence that the 
message will reach the destination. 
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Suppose between two RSUs, there are one or several road diversions. Among the traffic flow 
entering from the source RSU, only p fraction of flow goes to the destination RSU. N represents the 
number of vehicles passing the source RSU; the random variable X represents the number of 
vehicles that have passed by the source and will also pass the destination RSU (Figure 2.4). Let’s find 
out how many vehicles (N) should the source RSU ask to carry the message, in order to let the 
destination RSU have at least k vehicles passing through it, with a confidence of probability Pc (such 
as 95%). 
Because each vehicle has an independent probability p to go to the destination RSU, the random 
variable X follows Binomial distribution. If we denote ),;( pNnf  as the probability of exactly n  
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Figure 2.4: Number of relay vehicles depends on the probability of vehicles passing the destination. 
N is the total number of vehicles passing the source, X is the random variable representing the 







The question we asked above means that the probability of having less than k vehicles passing 
through the destination RSU must be no more than 1-Pc. Thus the following inequality formula must 
be satisfied: 
cPpNkfpNfpNf  1),;1(...),;1(),;0(  (2.5) 
For k>1 (which will be the case if we want more than one vehicle to deliver the message for 
redundancy or security purposes) Equation 2.5 does not have a closed-form solution. To derive the 
value of N, we can test N=1, N=2, N=3,..., until we find the smallest value of N satisfying the 
formula.  
When k=1, the above formula means that the value of N must satisfy:   
c
N Pp  1)1(  (2.6) 








  (2.7) 
Equation 2.7 gives the minimum number of vehicles that are required to carry a message in order for 
at least one vehicle passing the destination (with certain confidence level). Figure 2.5 shows the 
number of vehicles required for different values of p. 
2.2.4.2.4 Protocol Simplification based on GPS Data  
The large scale use of GPS technology has made GPS devices economical; it is likely that in the near 
future all modern vehicles will be equipped with GPS devices; GPS devices provide valuable data 
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such as up-to-date location, direction and speed. In addition, when a GPS device is used for 
navigation, it can provide destination and trajectory information. These additional data can be used 
to make the communication protocol simpler and more efficient. 
 
Figure 2.5: Number of relay vehicles (N) required to deliver a message to the destination (by at least 
one vehicle) with a 95% probability of confidence (Pc) for different probabilities (p) that a vehicle 
passing the source will also pass the destination. For example, if p = 0.5 and Pc = 0.95, we get N=5 
which means that in order to have 95% confidence that a message sent by the source reaches the 
destination, we need to relay the message through at least 5 vehicles.  
An RSU can query a passing-by vehicle for destination and trajectory information. Based on this 
information, the RSU can decide whether or not to choose the vehicle for forwarding messages to 
other RSUs. This will reduce the number of vehicles used to relay any given message. One possible 
implication of this is privacy; the owner of a vehicle may not want to disclose the vehicle’s 
destination or trajectory information to RSUs. This can be easily resolved as follows: When an RSU 
offers a message to a vehicle, it also includes the destination information of the message. The vehicle 
can then reply either “YES” if it can carry the message or “NO” if it cannot carry the message based 
on its driving trajectory. The vehicle may also choose to reply “Do not Know” if it does not want to 

























In this modified protocol, an RSU will relay a message to the minimum number of required vehicles; 
sometimes just one vehicle will be enough. However, this makes the protocol more prone to 
message dropping attacks (a malicious vehicle accepts a message for relaying but does not deliver it 
to the destination). Possible solutions include the use of end-to-end acknowledgement or an increase 
in redundancy by using more than the minimum required vehicles for message relay. 
2.3 Simulations 
Simulations were carried out to check the effectiveness of our proposed system. The simulator does 
not incorporate the details of lower level protocol layers (i.e., physical and MAC layers). All 
simulated vehicles and RSUs have the same transmission and reception ranges. A message transfer 
between a source and a destination is assumed to be successful if both entities are within the 
communication range of each other.  
2.3.1 Simulation Scenario I 
This set of simulations were carried out to find the minimum number of vehicles required to 
successfully transfer a message from a source RSU to a destination RSU with a given probability of 
confidence. A region of 25000m×6250m with road network as shown in Figure 2.4 was simulated. 
When a vehicle traveling towards the destination RSU passes the source RSU, the source RSU 
transmits the message to the vehicle. The message is then carried by the vehicle for possible delivery 
to the destination RSU. At each road junction, the vehicle decides to either maintain its direction of 
travel or divert according to a predefined probability. If the vehicle diverts and hence fails to deliver 
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the message to the destination RSU, the source RSU retransmits the message. This procedure is 
repeated until the message is successfully received by the destination RSU. In each simulation run, 
the source RSU sends 1000 messages and the number of retransmissions for each message is 
recorded. The simulation is repeated 100,000 times and the average number of messages received 
successfully after a particular number of retransmissions is recorded. 
Figure 2.6(a) shows the number of messages successfully received (Y-axis) using a particular number 
of retransmissions (X-axis) for p = 0.2 and p = 0.6 (p is the probability that a vehicle passing the 
source will also pass the destination). It shows that, for p = 0.6 case, more than 90% of messages 
can be successfully received by receiver within 4 retransmissions. From a different perspective, 
Figure 2.6(b) shows the number of received messages at the destination after less than or equal to 
each given number of retransmissions. Figure 2.6(b) can be used to find the minimum number of 
vehicles required to successfully transmit a message with a certain probability of confidence. Figure 
2.6(c) shows the number of vehicles required for confidence Pc = 95% for each probability p. The 
simulation results shown in Figure 2.6(c) are identical to the analytical results presented in Figure 2.5. 
2.3.2 Simulation Scenario II 
During the initial stages of VANET deployment, V2V communication will not be very effective. In 
addition, due to limited road infrastructure, the V2I communication will also be very limited. This 
will be a major setback to all VANET applications, such as transfer of a safety message from a point 
of incident to vehicles entering the area, or information about road blockage for possible diversion.  
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(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 2.6: (a) For the probability p=0.2 and p=0.6 (that a vehicle passing the source will also pass 
the destination), the number of messages successfully received at the destination RSU after a given 
number of retransmissions by the source RSU. (b) For different values of probability p, the number 
of received messages at the destination after less than or equal to each given number of 
retransmissions. (c) Number of Relay Vehicles (N) required to deliver the message to the destination 
with a 95% confidence probability (Pc) and different values of probability (p) 
We have considered two cases and compared the number of vehicles and time required to transfer a 
message from a source of information (which can be a vehicle passing the scene of incident, or an 
RSU) to a destination (which can be an emergency response vehicle or an RSU). In the first case, we 
have a limited roadside infrastructure and messages are transferred between the source and the 
destination via vehicles only. In the second case, we have intermediate standalone RSUs between the 
source and the destination, which help in relaying the message. In this case the source is also a 
standalone RSU. Simulations will help us ascertain the effectiveness of our proposed system in 
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We simulate a region of 25000m×6250m with a road network as shown in Figure 2.3. The number 
of smart vehicles on the simulation field (a total road length of 35000m), at any one time, is kept to 
5. This small number of vehicles is used to check the effectiveness of our proposed system during 
the initial deployment stages of VANET. V2V communication is ignored due to this small number 
of smart vehicles. At each junction, a vehicle can divert from its current direction of travel with a 
probability of diversion Pd . 
In both cases, the source RSU retransmits the message until it is received by the destination. In the 
second case, a vehicle carrying a message relays it to any intermediate RSU that it encounters. The 
number of retries (vehicles used to carry the information from the source) and the total time taken 
for the information to reach the destination is recorded for each message. A total of 1000 messages 
are transmitted in each simulation. The number of messages received at the destination after less 
than or equal to each given number of retries for Pd =0.5 are shown in Figure 2.7(a). The results 
indicate that the use of multiple (standalone intermediate) RSUs decreases the number of retries 
considerably. 
Figure 2.7(b) shows the number of relay vehicles used to transmit the message to the destination 
with a 95% of confidence probability. The probability of diversion is varied from 0.1 to 0.9. The 
results show that for the first case (without intermediate RSUs) the number of vehicles reaches its 
minimum value when Pd=0.5. This is due to the road layout: at the first road junction a small value 
of Pd is helpful, but at the second road junction a large value of Pd is more advantageous. The 
number of vehicles required for the scenario with multiple RSUs almost remains constant. This 
happens because the vehicles traveling on other roads also help in the successful delivery of 
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messages. The same pattern of results is obtained in the transmission delay of messages as shown in 
Figure 2.7(c). The results indicate a high performance gain when multiple (standalone intermediate) 
RSUs are used, and the transmission delay will be much more stable than the case when only two 
RSUs are used. This is true for both the message transmission delays and the number of relay 
vehicles required for successful message transmission. 
 
 
(a)       (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 2.7 (a) For probability of diversion Pd = 0.5 (that a vehicle passing road junction will divert 
from its direction of travel), the number of received messages at the destination after less than or 
equal to each given number of retransmissions by the source RSU. (b) Number of Relay Vehicles 
used by the source RSU to deliver the message at the destination with a 95% probability of 
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The proposed system effectively meets the challenges highlighted earlier. Details are given below: 
• The proposed system provides an immediate solution to the problem existing during 
VANET initial deployment stage (before a critical mass is achieved). 
• The proposed system maintains VANET function in scenarios where V2V 
communication is not possible due to road layout or traffic conditions. 
• The proposed system is progressive. RSUs of varying degrees of functionality can be 
integrated and later upgraded without the need to an overhaul of existing systems. 
• The proposed system is an economical. 
• The proposed system exhibits good scalability. More areas can easily be included in an 
existing VANET network by simply adding more RSUs. In addition, initially isolated 
regions can be later interconnected by RSU to RSU links. 
• The minimum number of RSUs required for the proposed system to work is very small 
as compared to conventional solutions. 
There are some limitations in the proposed design. First, because communication relies on RSUs to 
relay, it may be slow for vehicles to receive time-critical messages compared with V2V (or V2I with 
I2I) communication. However, in the VANET initial transition period, V2V and also I2I 
communication might not be possible due to the low density of smart vehicles on the roads and a 
lack of fully networked roadside units. Second, the VANET communication relies on the RSU 
infrastructure. It is possible that in some rural areas there are no RSU devices installed. Third, RSU 
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to RSU indirect communication relies on passing-by vehicles. Thus the communication may be slow 
and can be interrupted frequently when there are few smart vehicles around.  
2.5 Conclusion 
There are numerous proposed applications of VANET but most of them are not practical until a 
critical mass of fully networked roadside units and smart vehicles is achieved. It will be very difficult 
to achieve this critical mass in the initial years of VANET deployment. This difficulty will further 
slow down the market penetration. In this chapter, we have presented an economical and practicable 
solution to address this issue, which incorporates and relies on a very limited numbers of roadside 
units with very basic functionalities. Our solution is economical, scalable and upgradeable. We show 
that the solution is practical with the help from a small number of smart vehicles. The future work 
includes use of real traffic data for simulations and experiments 
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CHAPTER 3 INTERNET ACCESS THROUGH SATELLITE 
RECEIVE-ONLY TERMINALS 
Communication and especially the connectivity to the Internet is the basic requirement of most 
modern productive environments. We spend a considerable time traveling from one point to 
another via vehicles; this time can be more productive if we are connected to the Internet. A lot of 
research has been done to bring the Internet to vehicles. To this end, three main approaches have 
been adopted: Internet through roadside infrastructure alone or through roadside infrastructure 
using vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication [1 - 7], Internet through cellular network [1, 8, 9] and 
Internet through satellite (symmetric/asymmetric) [10 - 14]. However, all three approaches have 
some challenges to deal with. 
The Internet access through roadside infrastructure requires pervasive roadside units (RSUs) to 
achieve connectivity, since the typical radial range of an RSU is 250m so we need an RSU every 400 
to 500m. Further, these RSUs must all be connected to the Internet. Also, the installation, 
connection and maintenance of these RSUs will be quite expensive, and it may not be possible to 
achieve the desired connectivity, especially during the initial days of VANET deployment and along 
highways or in rural areas. This approach is based on vehicular network architecture defined by 
IEEE standards, i.e., IEEE standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) [15 - 
19]. The Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) of WAVE (IEEE P802.11p 
[19]) are based on Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications 
43 
defined by IEEE standard 802.11 [20]. Both vehicles and RSUs use same access technologies 
specified by WAVE standards. 
The Internet access through cellular networks, with the advent of 3G/4G technologies, provides 
data rates comparable to broadband; however, these technologies are not uniformly available 
throughout cellular coverage area, and hence, many users still get lower data rates. One of the design 
considerations for the cellular networks (to minimize the infrastructure cost) is to use larger cells 
where user density is low; this is especially the case along highways and in rural areas [21]. But in 
case of vehicular networks the density is likely to increase and may require up-gradation of cellular 
networks. In addition to these issues, when a vehicle crosses international boundary, the service 
providers and their carrier frequencies will often change, which makes user equipment more 
expensive and complex. Furthermore, this approach is also not compatible with the vehicular 
network architecture defined by IEEE standards for WAVE [15 - 19]; cellular access technologies 
are quite different from those specified by WAVE standards. This will make both VANET-spatial-
transition (between areas with varying degree of VANET coverage) and VANET-temporal-
transition (during later stages of VANET when previously not covered areas are also covered) 
expensive and difficult. 
The Internet access through symmetric satellite requires vehicles to be equipped with satellite 
transceiver, which adds to the cost of user equipment. Satellite channel suffers heavily from losses; 
these losses introduce errors in the communication and require some error correction mechanisms. 
The losses can be atmospheric or due to shadowing. The atmospheric losses are generally 
compensated by link margin but shadow losses generally make communication impossible. These 
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shadow losses are much more pronounced in urban areas where the areas are congested with 
buildings and other manmade objects. Therefore Internet access through satellite is particularly not 
an economical solution for urban areas. Further, this approach is also not compatible with the 
vehicular network architecture defined by IEEE standards for WAVE [15 - 19], and will make both 
the spatial and temporal transitions difficult. 
We present a solution that complements the existing ones and provides Internet connectivity during 
the initial deployment phase of the vehicular networks and also in areas with very scarce roadside 
infrastructure (such as along highways and in rural areas). The solution uses satellite receive-only 
terminals and very few (widely spaced) RSUs. It can support TCP connection even when the uplink 
is interrupted for long durations of time. We present a number of options with varying degrees of 
error handling capabilities and recommend their usage according to the environment. The use of 
RSUs makes our approach compatible to the vehicular network architecture defined by IEEE 
standards for WAVE [15 - 19]. Later on when additional RSUs are installed, the solution will 
improve its performance by making more use of RSUs and also by reduction of inter-RSU distance, 
and hence, enabling a smooth transition to fully functional VANET defined by IEEE WAVE 
standards [15 - 19]. Similarly, it will ease the handoff between areas of varying VANET coverage. 
The solution is cost effective, incremental and practical. 
A lot of research to address challenges of Internet (especially TCP performance) over delay tolerant 
networks (DTN)/satellite networks has been carried out. In order to avoid the repetitions, we will, 
not focus on lower level details of what particular Internet protocol to be used; rather, we will 
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identify the desired characteristics of the protocol and any already defined protocol (or combinations 
of these) can be used for the proposed solution. 
The chapter is organized in six sections. Section 3.1 highlights the motivation and challenges related 
to the research work. Section 3.2 discusses related research work in the field. Section 3.3 explains 
important characteristics of satellite communication and mobile satellite communication model. 
Section 3.4 discusses the proposed system design and its various options along with the 
recommended usage. Section 3.5 describes the simulation scenarios and important results of the 
simulation. And in the end, section 3.6 presents conclusion. 
3.1 Motivation and Challenges 
If we define the utilization of a roadside unit as the length of time it successfully communicates with 
a particular vehicle (the utilization is directly proportional to the radial communication range of 
roadside unit and inversely proportional to the speed of the vehicle), then the utility of roadside 
units is much more in case of urban areas as compared to that in rural areas or along the highways. 
This is because of their complementary traffic characteristics, i.e., the average vehicle speeds are 
much lower in urban areas than that in rural areas or along highways, and also the ratio between 
move and stop is more inclined towards stop in urban areas (because of frequent intersections, turns 
and road signals) than that in rural areas or along highways. 
This means the connectivity achieved with a given number of roadside units is much more in case of 
urban areas than that of rural areas or along highways. Therefore, to achieve same degree of 
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connectivity for a particular vehicle, we will need much more roadside units in rural areas (or along 
highways) than that in urban areas. Further, the installation and maintenance of roadside units in 
urban areas is much more economical than in rural areas. Also, the networking of roadside units to 
Internet is also easy in case of urban areas, since urban areas already have pervasive Internet 
connectivity. It is intuitive that the solutions completely based on roadside units are not practicable 
in rural areas (or along highways) especially during the initial deployment stages of vehicular 
network. Therefore, the extension of Internet to vehicular network in rural areas (or along highways) 
and especially during the initial deployment stages is not a trivial task. 
The movement of vehicles is not restricted within one region; it is normal for users to travel through 
different urban/rural areas and along different highways on a single day. Any solution for rural area 
must be compatible with that of urban area: the urban VANET will, most likely, be based on RSUs 
as defined by WAVE standards. Therefore, the solution must support smooth spatial transition 
(handoff) between these regions. Further, during later stages as more and more area will be covered 
by RSUs, the solution should also support smooth temporal transition to mature VANET. 
A number of digital video broadcasting (DVB) standards define interactive data services including 
Internet access via satellite, public switched telecommunication network, wireless etc [22 - 26]. In 
[23, 24], both the broadcast and interaction channels are via satellite which makes user equipment 
costly and incompatible with VANET standards. Whereas, in [26] both channels are via wireless 
(VHF/UHF bands) similar to VANET. DVB standards also support the combination of different 
DVB interactive systems [22]. Satellite as broadcast/downlink channel coupled with dial-up as 
interaction/return channel to provide Internet to home users especially in rural areas has been used 
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successfully for quite some time [28 - 32]. Our solution uses satellite as broadcast/downlink channel 
and terrestrial wireless (defined by VANET standards) as interaction/return channel.  
The Internet and also some of the possible VANET applications exhibit asymmetric nature of 
traffic, in this downlink traffic is many orders of magnitude as compared to the uplink traffic [27, 
28]. This asymmetry is likely to increase with time as more and more content is becoming 
multimedia in nature. We use asymmetric satellite communication (downlink only) to take advantage 
of this asymmetry. The use of satellite to provide connectivity in rural areas also seems logical since 
there will be less shadowing and hence low errors in rural areas (or along highways). The 
interaction/uplink is via roadside infrastructure using vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication 
or V2V in conjunction with V2I communication. However, the limited number of RSUs makes the 
traditional asymmetric satellite solutions impracticable. The challenge in VANET is the intermittent 
availability of terrestrial interaction/return channel with possible long disruption periods especially 
during the initial days of VANET deployment. 
3.2 Related Work 
The solutions presented so far for provision of Internet to vehicles can be broadly divided into three 
categories; first, the solutions relying on roadside infrastructure or vehicle to vehicle communication, 
second, the solutions relying in some way on cellular networks and third, the solutions making use 
of satellite links. We will refer some of the important research papers in these categories. 
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A number of researches such as FleetNet, Drive-thru Internet, etc extensively rely on road side 
infrastructure and/or vehicle to vehicle communication to provide Internet connectivity to vehicles 
[1 - 4, 6, 33]. The basic requirement for these solutions is availability of pervasive roadside 
infrastructure and/or a large number of smart vehicles. Both these assumptions are not realistic 
during the initial deployment stage, further use of vehicle to vehicle communication has many 
security issues, such as privacy, confidentiality, denial of service etc. Solutions based on existing WiFi 
networks face similar problems [7]. 
A number of researches have incorporated cellular networks in VANET [1, 8, 9, 34]. Cellular 
networks are mostly used as a backbone - a replacement to roadside infrastructure. Cellular 
networks, though pervasive, offer lower data rates as compared to Wi-Fi (roadside infrastructure). 
Although with the advent of 3G/4G technologies data rates close to broadband can be achieved, 
these technologies are not uniformly available throughout cellular coverage areas and many users are 
still dependent on other heterogeneous technologies (WAP, GPRS, EDGE, HSDPA, etc [35]). 
Further, cellular data plan subscriptions are expensive; an unconstrained plan with a 5GB/month 
limit costs approximately $700/year. 5GB/month means per day a user on average can send/receive 
50 emails (20 with attachments), download a song and a game/app, view 40 web pages, posts 10 
social media posts with photos, and watch a streaming video of 40 minutes [36]. Although unlimited 
data plans and those that cost tens of dollars are also available, but these plans have fine print 
conditions, such as ‘usage patterns’ (no file sharing, excessive usage, etc), ‘can only be used on smart 
phones’ (no tethering), ‘can only access certain service’ (email, predefined websites, etc), and ‘must 
have a qualifying voice plan’. Some service providers are charging approximately $2/MB or 1¢/KB 
for web browsing. All major cellular service providers are now offering and encouraging users (such 
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as offering ‘unlimited Wi-Fi usage with data plan’) to access data through hotspots (which use Wi-Fi 
just like VANET roadside infrastructure instead of 3G/4G). This also highlights cost/benefit of Wi-
Fi over 3G/4G. Cellular networks also have several other disadvantages such as expensive to 
built/maintain, billing/licensing issues among different service providers, higher roaming rates, large 
and variable latency, central switching/resource management, difficult to scale and occasional 
blackouts [5, 6, 37-42]. 
Use of satellite channel for provision of Internet to terrestrial (static) and mobile users has been an 
interesting topic of research. Most of the researches in this area are related to performance-studies 
or enhancements of Internet protocols over symmetric/asymmetric satellite channels with stationary 
nodes [28 – 32, 43 - 47]. Symmetric satellite communication does not take advantage of asymmetric 
nature of Internet traffic and is more expensive. Further, we are dealing with asymmetric satellite 
communication where the nodes are mobile.  
There are also quite a few researches dealing with the mobile nodes but most of these study Internet 
protocol performance/enhancements [10 - 14]. Further these consider symmetric satellite channel 
i.e., both uplink and downlink communication takes place via satellite. Symmetric communication 
requires expensive transceiver at the mobile nodes and it does not take advantage of the asymmetric 
nature of Internet communication. Whereas, we are using satellite downlink communication only 
and the nodes are mobile nodes.  
Our work comes closer to [48], where asymmetric satellite communication has been used for 
provision of Internet to the mobile nodes. In [48] the satellite is only used for downlink and uplink 
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is via cellular network. The system design requires the mobile node to be equipped with both the 
satellite and cellular interfaces. The design suffers from the disadvantages of using cellular network 
(described earlier). Also, the design does not incorporate any roadside infrastructure, which when 
available could provide much higher data rates at lower costs. Further this also implies that the 
design will not be very successful in urban areas since satellite communication is not very reliable in 
urban areas (connection/fade ratio can be 33.3/66.6 in higher density cities like New York [49]). 
Our system design differs in a number of ways from the researches presented above. First, we use 
satellite communication for downlink only thus reducing complexity of user terminals and operating 
costs. We use roadside infrastructure for uplink communication and do not need any cellular 
transceivers or satellite transmitters at nodes. This eases compatibility with other vehicular network 
architectures. The design works with very small number of RSUs and is especially suited for initial 
deployment stages. We present a number of options with varying degrees of error handling 
capabilities and recommend their suitability for different environments. 
3.3 Satellite Channel 
3.3.1 Channel Characteristics 
The satellite channel is characterized by long delays, high fading/attenuation to signal, high 
bandwidth and in-order packet delivery. As the signal travels from satellite to an earth station (or a 
mobile node as in this case) it undergoes a variety of impairments or losses. Some of these losses are 
constant, others can be calculated based on statistical data and some are dependent on weather 
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conditions [50]. A satellite system design takes care of all clear weather losses by including 
appropriate margins for these losses. It can be safely assumed that the existing satellite link takes 
care of all such losses, the only losses that need to considered are atmospheric attenuation (mainly 
due to rain, ice etc) and mobile channel losses (multipath fading and signal shadowing).  
The multipath fading is caused because, the received signal in addition to direct signal also contains 
components which are reflected off different surrounding objects. These reflected or echo 
components mainly depend on the environment such as rural, urban or suburban. The fading can be 
short term usually caused by reflections over surrounding surfaces or long term caused by hills, 
buildings, trees etc [51]. The Shadowing occurs when the direct satellite signal is obstructed; main 
causes of shadowing can be buildings, trees, bridges etc. The shadowing also depends on the 
environment of the user. In case of geostationary satellites the shadowing and multipath fading is 
mostly determined by the user’s mobility characteristics, the environment and satellite elevation 
angle [52]. So to summarize it can be said that the mobile channel losses are closely related to the 
environment of the user. 
3.3.2 Channel Model 
The effects of satellite communication on Internet and especially TCP have long been an area of 
Interest to researchers. For this different satellite channel models have been assumed/used. The 
simplest of these assumes satellite channel as an error-free/error-resilient channel and just studies 
the effects of delays, bandwidth and asymmetry [31, 47]. An extension to this model is to assume 
some fixed values of bit error rates (BER) and study the effects on protocols [46]. Another model is 
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based on additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) satellite channel [43, 45]. All these models 
consider the receiver to be static, but in our case the node will be mobile and therefore the channel 
behavior will change with time. The most commonly used land mobile satellite channel (LMSC) 
model is a two-state Markov chain based channel model, which has been represented by a digital 
two-state Gilbert-Elliott model [52, 53]. We will also be using this two-state channel model. 
It is a two-state ON/OFF model. In ON (1) state the communication is error free after applying 
existing satellite communication channel coding; the state mainly covers line of sight (LOS) region. 
In OFF (0) state communication errors are beyond the existing channel correction capability and 
reliable communication is not possible, the state mainly covers non line of sight 
(NLOS)/shadowed/deep-fade regions [12, 53, 54]. Figure 3.1 shows the two-state model [52]. 
Transition probabilities of this model depend on the environment (mean duration of ON/OFF 
state), vehicle speed and transmission (bit) rate [54]. The model excludes fading events with short 
durations, so the state transitions can be assumed to take place at cell boundaries, where a cell 
corresponds to a data segment.  
 
Figure 3.1: Two-state ON/OFF Land Mobile Satellite Channel (LMSC) Model 




Denote pxy as the transition probability of going from state x to state y, one-step state transition 
matrix is given by Equation 3.1. Denote πx as the steady state probability of state x, the two steady 
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Denote Dx as the mean sojourn duration of state x, for a constant transmission-rate/average-node-
speed in a particular environment the two transition probabilities are given by Equation 3.3. Denote 
px(>n) as the probability that a state x lasts for longer than n duration units, px(>n) for two states are 
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The average time in each state mainly depends on the environment in which the vehicle/node is 
moving, Table 3.1 shows the different environments, average vehicle speeds in these environments 
and average bad/good state times for these environments (the values of the Table 3.1 are from [54]), 





Table 3.1 Average time in ON and OFF states for different environments 
 Urban Suburban Rural Highway 








State ON (1) 
Duration – D1 
22s 8s 16s 18s 
State OFF (0) 
Duration – D0 
15s 2s 4s 2s 
 
Table 3.2 Probabilities associated to LMSC Model 
Transition Probability from 
state x to state y  
pxy  p11, p00, p01, p10 
Steady state probability of 
state x 
πx π1, π0  
Probability that a state x lasts 
for longer than n duration 
units 
px(>n) p1(>n), p0(>n) 
3.3.3 Satellite Communication 
The satellite downlink communication makes use of existing error correction techniques on each 
transmitted segment. It is assumed that the existing error correction techniques applied are sufficient 
to provide error free communication in the absence of deep fading and shadowing [12, 53, 54]. To 
further reduce the effects of segment loss due to deep fading and shadowing, time diversity is 
applied [13, 55]. It can be achieved by inter-user or intra-user segment interleaving or both (Figure 
3.2). This helps in spreading the error among different users or different sessions, and by employing 
error correction techniques at higher layer (discussed later) the chances of recovery are improved. 
The interleaving removes the impact of consecutive losses and therefore we can assume that 
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consecutive data segments of a session/user are independent of each other. This assumption 
simplifies our analysis of segment losses under different architectures that we propose next. In rest 
of the chapter (especially in figures) the segments considered/shown adjacent to each other are 




Figure 3.2: Inter and Intra user segment interleaving to achieve time diversity 
Independence Analysis: We can provide mathematical formula to show the degree of dependency 
between two consecutive segments of one session’s transmission after using the above segment 
interleaving method. The objective of interleaving method is to disperse a session’s segments such 
that one satellite error will not cause consecutive losses for a single session. In term of the satellite 
User - U1
Session – A Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
Session – B Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
| | | | |
Session – N Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
User - U2
Session – A Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
Session – B Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
| | | | |
Session – N Segment -S1 S2 S3 S4 … … … Sn
Actual segment transmission sequence in time
(U1, A, S1) (U2, A, S1) … (Un, A, S1) (U1, A, S2) … (Un, A, Sn) … (Un, N, Sn)
t
Where (Ua, X, Sc) is segment # ‘c’ of  session # X for user 'a’ 
Consecutive segments of  one User
(U1, A, S1) (U1, A, S2) … (U1, A, Sn) (U1, B, S1) … (U1, B, Sn) … (U1, B, Sn)
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channel Markov on/off model, it means, we need to disperse two consecutive segments of a session 
such that their Markov states are independent. 
Denote d as the number of Markov state transitions between the transmissions of two consecutive 
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where d
ijp  is the d-step transition probability from state i to state j.  
From the steady state analysis, we know that as the value of d increases, dp00  and 
dp10  will gradually 
converge to
0 , and 
dp01  and 
dp11  will converge to 1 . Therefore, we can define the degree of 


























P  (3.7) 
The interleaving method requires that the degree of dependency between two consecutive segments 
of a session is smaller than a predefined parameter δ, i.e., Pdependent<δ. To achieve this, we can adjust 
the interleaving parameter, d, to satisfy this requirement. 
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Because the d-step transition probabilities in Equation 3.7 do not have closed form solutions, to find 
the suitable value of d, we could try d=1, d=2, … to derive the corresponding values of Pdependent , until 
the requirement Pdependent<δ is satisfied.  
3.4 Proposed Architecture 
Our focus is on provision/extension of Internet to vehicular networks in rural areas and along the 
highways especially during the initial deployment stages. The working environment is characterized 
by a very small number of RSUs that are widely interspaced. These RSUs may be co-located with 
isolated populated areas along the highways and are connected to the Internet. The environment 
does not exhibit high shadow losses.  
3.4.1 Assumptions 
Our system design is based on a few simple assumptions. First, vehicles are equipped with GPS, can 
record their location at precise time and can provide direction of travel information to the RSU. 
Second, vehicles can receive the satellite broadcast. And third, RSUs have the digital map of the area 
and are aware of the locations of adjacent RSUs. 
3.4.2 Basic Idea 
A vehicle connects to a nearby RSU and requests some Internet data. The request will include 
location, speed and direction of travel of the vehicle. This information will help an RSU to calculate 
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possible connection time left and possible next RSU. If sufficient connection time is left then the 
request may be serviced through the same RSU. When the vehicle exits the coverage of current 
RSU, further responses to the vehicle’s earlier request will be sent to the next RSU in the direction 
of travel. If two RSUs are located at a reasonable distance, which is likely in urban environment, the 
next RSU will continue to deliver the content to the vehicle when the vehicle comes within its 
coverage area (RSU-based region in Figure 3.3). If the next RSU is not within a reasonable distance 
(especially in rural environment where the RSUs will be widely spaced) then satellite downlink 
channel will be used for delivery of content (satellite downlink-only region in Figure 3.3). We will 
mostly address the satellite downlink option in this chapter. 
 











































While a vehicle travels between two RSUs in the satellite downlink-only region, it cannot send 
acknowledgements. In order to keep TCP connection alive and avoid unnecessary retransmissions, 
adaptive TCP timeout and delayed ACK will be used [56, 57]. TCP timeouts will be calculated/ 
predicted depending on the location of the next RSU and will be used accordingly. The downlink 
has large delays so in order to avoid unnecessary retransmissions selective acknowledgement will be 
used. Modified TCP is only employed between the proxy and mobile host so no modifications are 
required in protocols running on existing Internet. The use of UDP is much simpler than TCP and 





Figure 3.4: Protocol stacks for different regions. (a) Content transfer to mobile node via Road side 







































The flow of traffic between different entities is outlined below (refer to Figure 3.3): 
 The mobile node authenticates with the proxy through an RSU and is issued with an IP 
address; this IP address will uniquely identify the mobile node as long as it remains within 
the boundary of the proxy. 
 The mobile node sends a request to the RSU. 
 The RSU forwards the request to the proxy. 
 The proxy establishes a connection to Server on behalf of the mobile node and gets/caches 
all the content (based on initial request of the mobile node). 
 The proxy establishes a connection with the mobile node on behalf of Server and sends the 
content via an RSU. 
 When the mobile node moves out of the range of an RSU and the direct connection with 
RSU times out (Figure 3.3, satellite downlink-only region); the RSU informs the proxy about 
expected time of next ACK from the mobile node. The time period depends on speed of the 
vehicle and location of the next RSU along the travel direction of the mobile node. 
 The proxy starts sending further content via satellite. It keeps on sending without waiting for 
ACK from the node till the time period expires. 
 The mobile node keeps on receiving data via satellite till it reaches the next RSU (Figure 3.3, 
end of satellite downlink-only region).  
 The mobile node sends ACK for the received data or NACK for segments lost due to 
errors. 
 The proxy updates the mobile node’s new position and acts according to ACK/NACK.  
 The process is repeated till all the requested content is delivered to the mobile node.  
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3.4.3 Options 
Four different options have been defined for transmission of data from satellite to vehicles: Baseline, 
Repeated Transmission, Forward Error Correction, and Error Location Prediction and Avoidance. 
These options have different levels of error handling capabilities with corresponding overheads and 
delays. A comparison between these options is given in Table 3.3. 
3.4.3.1 Baseline 
A vehicle sends a request to its nearby RSU (Figure 3.5, R1), which in turn forwards the request to 
the proxy server. The proxy server gets the response/data from the server and forwards it to the 
satellite gateway. The proxy server splits the end-to-end connection between the vehicle and server 
[58]. It maintains two separate connections, one with the server on behalf of the vehicle and the 
other with the vehicle. The session with vehicle will be asymmetric, that is, the down link will be 
through satellite and return will be through RSUs. No modifications are required on the server side 
or on the satellite downlink. 
The connection between the proxy and the vehicle will employ TCP enhancements/modifications 
such as Adaptive timeout, delayed ACK, and selective ACK/NAK [56, 57]. The adaptive timeout 
caters for the time during which the vehicle cannot send ACKs, that is while traveling between the 
RSUs (Figure 3.5, between R1 and R2). 
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When a request is received by the proxy, it forwards the request to the original server in a separate 
connection. It also calculates the timeouts and delays (for delayed ACK) expected based on the 
distance between adjacent RSUs (Figure 3.5, between R1 and R2), the vehicle speed and its direction 
of travel. The proxy server receives all the data, which maybe a large file, from the server and also 
keeps the connection alive for further requests from the vehicle (this will be necessary if the 
transaction has to be completed after receiving some response from the vehicle during its 
connection with the next RSU). The proxy server then forwards the data to the vehicle through the 
satellite gateway and waits for the ACK/NAK. Because of high bandwidth-delay product (the delay 
of the satellite communication and also between sending the data and receiving ACK due to 
separation of RSUs), it may be necessary that all data segments are sent before waiting for an 
ACK/NAK from the vehicle. 
 
Figure 3.5: Baseline architecture, delivery of content takes place through satellite while the mobile 
node is traveling between R1 and R2. The mobile node sends NAK for the lost segments when 
reaching R2, where R2 takes charge and resends these lost segments to the mobile node. 
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If some of the received frames have been lost (Figure 3.5, segments 4, 5, 13, 14 and 15) then the 
vehicle sends selective ACK/NAK on its next contact with roadside infrastructure (Figure 3.5, R2). 
These ACK/NAK segments are forwarded to the proxy server, which retransmits the lost segments 
through satellite/RSU. 
Analysis: If the transmission consists of N chunks of data segments and each chunk is transmitted 













  (3.8) 
The probability that all N chunks of data segments are successfully transmitted, before reaching the 
next RSU, is given by: 
N
success pP   (3.9) 
3.4.3.2 Repeated Transmissions 
 A method to address segment losses is by repeating the complete transmission in cyclic manner for 
a fixed number of times. This option adds maximum data redundancy. Although this is not an 
efficient utilization of the bandwidth available and we will have low information per bit transmitted, 
this approach can mitigate the effects of channel impairments. Especially during the initial VANET 
deployment stages when not many of smart vehicles will be on roads, a given satellite channel will be 
shared by a limited number of vehicles and each vehicle will have sufficient share of satellite 
bandwidth, which can be used for repeated transmissions. Also, during the initial stages there will be 
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fewer numbers of RSUs which means larger distances between RSUs and more time to service a 
given request. This available time can be utilized for the redundancy. 
This scheme suffers from long delays because in worst case a vehicle might have to wait for a 
complete cycle of retransmission to recover the lost data segment. It has high delay but is a suitable 
scheme when we are experiencing high error rate that cannot be corrected by other schemes such as 
Forward Error Correction (FEC). 
Figure 3.6 shows a vehicle driving between two widely spaced RSUs. The data is being sent through 
satellite which comprises of segments numbered 1 to 8. The vehicle fails to receive segments 4 and 5 
during the first transmission cycle since it was passing through error zone 1 during their 
transmissions. The vehicle recovers the lost segments from the second transmission cycle and is 
successful in receiving all eight segments before reaching the next RSU, where it acknowledges the 
receipt of all the segments. 
Analysis of the number of transmissions: We present the mathematical formula to derive the number of 
transmissions required in order to achieve a desired transmission success rate. This analysis is 
possible because the segments of one session are transmitted independent with each other as 
introduced earlier.  
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Figure 3.6: Repeated transmission, whole data set is repeated several times. Data segment(s) lost can 
be recovered from later repeated transmissions. 
Assume that a session transmission requires N chunks of data segments. Because each chunk is 
transmitted independently, it is transmitted during the satellite Good signal status with the 
probability p as defined in Equation 3.8). 
Denote the system transmission success probability when it implements n repeated transmissions as 
Psuccess(n). The session transmission is treated as successful if the recipient receives all N chunks of data 
without error before reaching the next RSU. Thus we can derive Equation 3.10. If the desired 
transmission success rate is required to be Pr, we need to choose the number of transmissions n such 




















3.4.3.3 Forward Error Correction (FEC) 
When deep fades happen, complete segments may be lost so link layer error correction mechanism 
implemented by satellite downlink cannot recover all lost data. For such a situation, FEC and 
interleaving at higher layers such as transport layer may be used to address the issue of long burst 
errors. Two possible schemes can be adopted, FEC at session level and FEC at segment/packet 
level [51]. Both have their advantages and disadvantages. 
At segment level, a fixed number of data segments are grouped together and parity segments are 
added based on the selected FEC algorithm. The success depends on the number of segments lost. 
In case of erasure codes the lost data can be recovered as long as the number of lost segments is no 
more than the number of parity segments added [59]. 
At the session level, the session is first divided into fixed sized blocks and then parity blocks are 
added to it. Since all sessions are not of equal size, FEC codes that operate on a fixed number of 
blocks cannot be employed here. Different sessions can be further interleaved to further spread each 
individual session in time and avoid the damages of long burst of errors. 
The segments for different users, vehicles in this case, can be further interleaved or multiplexed. 
This provides another layer of spreading in time and the number of segments lost of a particular 
node or of a particular session will be further reduced by a factor defined by the number of nodes. 
This makes error correction mechanism more robust to deep fades and shadow. It may be possible 
to limit the number of lost segments per session within the tolerance of FEC employed. If the 
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number of segments lost is more than the tolerance then the lost segments may be requested again 
at the next RSU through NAK mechanisms explained earlier. It is important to note that 
retransmission of all lost segments may not be necessary in this case since we only need to bring the 
number of lost segments within the tolerance range of FEC employed. 
Analysis: If the session/file consists of N data segments and α rate erasure codes are used, αN 
segments will be added to the transmission and can therefore handle up to αN segment losses. The 
success probability, before reaching the next RSU, can be given as Equation 3.11 which means we 
can derive Equation 3.12. Psuccess for α = 0.10, 0.20 and different values of N are shown in Figure 
3.9(b). 
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3.4.3.4 Error Location Prediction and Avoidance 
 The satellite mobile channel suffers mostly from shadowing and fading. These errors are strongly 
correlated to the environment. Vehicles traveling along a particular highway are expected to 
experience channel impairments at approximately the same locations (referred as “error zones”). If 
the location of these error zones can be registered and the segments that were sent to a vehicle while 
it was passing through these error zones can be determined, then these segments may be 
retransmitted to the vehicle without waiting for an ACK/NAK from the vehicle. This will improve 
the performance since the vehicle does not need to wait for the next RSU, which may be quite far 
off, to recover from the error. 
68 
The location of error zones can be determined if a vehicle also includes location information with 
NAK, which is the location where segment loss was experienced. This location information is used 
to predict the possible location of segment losses for future vehicles traveling along the same path. 
For example in Figure 3.5 the vehicle experiences loss of segments 4 and 5 in error zone 1 and can 
report {NAK (4,5), Error Zone 1} to RSU-R2. (Also loss of segments 13, 14 and 15 in error zone 2 
can be reported as {NAK (13,14,15), Error Zone 2}). 
The error locations reported by different vehicles may have some variations; these variations may be 
due to a slight shift in error location, imperfections in recording error location, or imperfection in 
knowing packet loss locations. The effects of this variation among different error zone locations can 
be minimized by using a smoothed error location (similar to TCP RTT model [60]). If α is the 
smoothing factor (that determines the weightage of old value) and ε is the latest reported error 
location, the smoothed error location E can be defined by Equation 3.13. The error zone span Z can 
be taken as Z= C V centered at E, where V is the bad-state/error-zone variance and C is a constant.  
E=αE +(1-α)ε (3.13) 
The time period during which the vehicle was traveling through a registered error zone can be 
estimated from the vehicle’s speed and its initial time-location information. The fact that the speed 
of vehicles has generally less variations in highway environment also helps in minimizing the 
estimation error. However, an error margin can be added on both sides of probable error location to 
cater for variations in driving speeds. The RSU with which the vehicle was last 
authenticated/associated (Figure 3.7, R1) listens for the segments which were sent during the error 
zone period and sends NAK to the proxy for retransmission of these segments. 
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Take Figure 3.7 as an example. A vehicle sends a request to RSU R1, which forwards the request to 
the proxy server and data is sent to the vehicle via satellite. The RSU R1 calculates approximate times 
({t0-t1} and {t2-t3}) when the vehicle will be passing through error zones. It then monitors the 
satellite transmissions destined to this vehicle. It records the segment numbers sent by satellite when 
the vehicle passes through these error zones (segments {4, 5}, {11, 12, 13}) and sends NAK to the 
proxy server for these segments (segments NAK {4, 5}, NAK {11, 12, 13}). When receiving these 
NAKs, The proxy server retransmits the lost segments through satellite.  
When the vehicle reaches the next RSU, it sends NAK if it still could not receive all the segments. 
These NAK locations are then used by previous RSU to modify its error zone information. It is 
important to note that there is no way for the initial RSU to know if an earlier reported error zone 
has disappeared or not. There may be a situation (e.g. heavy rain) when most of the locations are 
marked as error zones. To address this possible situation it is necessary, from time to time, to reset 
the error zones to zero. 
 
Figure 3.7: Error location prediction and avoidance. The system predicts the segments which may 
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Analysis: If a session consists of N data segments and the segments transmitted during Bad states 
that are successfully predicted (assume pd is the probability for successful error zone prediction) are 
retransmitted during a future Good state. Then the probability that all N segments are successfully 
transmitted, before reaching the next RSU, is given by Equation 3.14. Psuccess for pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09 
and different values of N are given in Figure 3.9(c). 
Psuccess =[ p /(1- pd (1- p) ]
N (3.14) 
3.4.4 Enhancements Using V2V Communication  
V2V communication can be used in a variety of ways to further enhance the efficiency of above 
mentioned techniques. 
3.4.4.1 Local Error Recovery 
If same satellite channel is used by a number of vehicles in a region in time sharing basis then it is 
possible for vehicles to cache the data destined for other vehicles. The amount of data cached and 
how long it is cached is function of available storage space. A cyclic buffer may be used for this 
purpose; the oldest data is overwritten when it becomes full. Fast indexing can be done using hash 
tables. This way when a vehicle exits error zone, it can sent NAK to next coming vehicle which may 
be able to transmit the requested packet from its cache (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8c).  
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(a)       (b) 
 
(c)       (d) 
  
(e) 
Figure 3.8: Enhancements using V2V communication. (a) packets {1,2,3,4} are lost by V1 since 
traveling through error zone. (b) V1 send NAK{1,2,3,4} to V2. (c) V2 sends the cached packets 
{1,2,3,4} to V1. (d) NAK{1,2,3,4} of V1 are relayed to R1 by V2, and the packets{1,2,3,4} are 
retransmitted via satellite. (e) Packets {1,2,3,4} are being relayed to V1 by R2 via V3. Local Error 
Recovery: (a)→(b)→(c), NAK/ACK Relay: (a)→(b)→(d), Retransmission Relay: (a)→(b)→(d)→(e) 
3.4.4.2 NAK/ACK Relay 
Another possible use is to relay NAK to previous RSU using vehicles traveling in opposite direction. 
This way the lost packet can be retransmitted via satellite and the vehicle does not have to wait till it 
reaches next RSU to report lost packets (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8d). Further extension of this approach 
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3.4.4.3 Retransmission Relay 
The retransmission of lost packets may also be carried out by next RSU via vehicles traveling in 
opposite direction (Figure 3.8a, 3.8b, 3.8d, 3.8e). In this case the security of spoofed 
acknowledgements has to be ensured. 
3.4.5 Comparison of Options 
The options presented in preceding sections offer different levels of error tolerance at the cost of 
overheads and delays. One must balance the performance (error tolerance) vs. cost (overheads and 
delays) in selecting a particular solution; also, some options may be more suited to a particular 
environment than the other environments. The baseline architecture uses simple ACK/NAK for 
flow control and error correction. This scheme has no overhead but successful completion of 
communication may be delayed till the vehicle reaches the next RSU. This architecture is suitable 
where RSUs are not very widely dispersed. Error location prediction and avoidance uses proactive 
retransmission of predicted lost segments. This scheme has low overheads and low delays. This 
scheme is especially useful where satellite mobile channel losses are reasonably localized in certain 
areas. Forward error correction based architecture has low delays at the cost of medium overheads. 
It is suitable where errors are randomly distributed and Bad state durations are within the FEC 
tolerances. Repeated Transmission is the most robust scheme, it is especially useful where longer 
durations of Bad state is experienced, but at the cost of having high overhead and medium delays. 
Figure 3.9(d) compares the success probabilities of different architectures. Note that the error 
location prediction (pd=0.9) performs almost the same as repeated transmission (n=2). A summary 
of the options with recommended usage is also presented in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Recommended usage of different options 
Option Overhead Delay Recommended Usage 
Baseline None High 





Where Bad state duration is 




Where Bad state duration is 





Where Bad state environments 
are relatively stable over a 
relatively long period of time 
3.5 Evaluation 
Simulations were carried out to ascertain the correctness of our analysis and to compare the 
performances of various presented architectural options. It is assumed that the node/vehicle has 
already requested the file/content via an RSU and is now travelling through the “satellite downlink-
only region” where, the requested file/content is being sent via satellite downlink (refer to Figure 
3.3). We mainly address the satellite downlink part, and hence, the simulations were also restricted to 
“Satellite downlink-only region”. The satellite downlink has been modeled according to the land 
mobile satellite channel (LMSC) model presented in section 3.3. The environment is Highway with 
parameters defined in Table 3.1. The simulated LMSC characteristic probabilities are shown in 
Figure 3.10, which closely match the ones defined by Equation 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4. 100 sets of Markov 
chains were generated with equal distribution of initial/starting state. Each Markov chain had a 
length of 2x106. For simulation first 5x105 states were skipped to offset the effect of initial/starting 





































































Figure 3.9: Analytical success probabilities (a) Repeated transmission (n = 2, 3) (b) Forward error 
correction (α = 0.1, 0.2) (c) Error location prediction and avoidance (pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09) (d) 
Comparison between baseline, repeated transmission, forward error correction and error location 
prediction & avoidance architectures. 
The file size is defined in terms of segments and varies from 10 to 50. It is assumed that one 
segment is sent during one Markov state, each state being of 1ms. A segment sent during a Good 
state is received error free while a segment sent during a Bad state is lost. The time between two 



























































Prediction (Pd = 0.9)
FEC (Rate = 0.10)
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consecutive segments of a particular node/vehicle follows Poisson distribution with parameter λ. 
100,000 simulation runs were carried out for each file; every 1000 simulation runs used one 
generated satellite channel Markov chain model. The simulation results compared with the 
corresponding analytical results are shown in Figure 3.11. This figure confirms the correctness of 
analysis presented earlier. The performance of Error location prediction and avoidance at Pd=0.9 is 
comparable to Repeated transmission but with a much lower overhead. The transmission time and 
segment loss probabilities for different architectures are shown in Figure 3.12; (a) gives the 
probability that the segments lost (measured as a fraction of total file size) is less than or equal to a 
given value and (b) gives the probability that the file transfer time (normalized with the mean 
transfer time of baseline architecture) is less than or equal to a given value. The results clearly show 
the superiority of Error location prediction option over Repeated transmission and also confirm the 
characteristic descriptions of different architectural options presented in Table 3.3. 
3.6 Conclusion 
We have presented a viable solution for provision of the Internet access to the vehicular networks, 
especially during the initial deployment phase of vehicular networks and also in areas with very 
scarce roadside infrastructure (such as along highways and in rural areas). The solution is practical 
and economical since it only uses satellite receive-only terminals and very few (widely spaced) RSUs. 
We have also presented a number of error handling options which can be employed according to the 
operating environments. We have compared these options with mathematical analysis and 
simulation; both the comparisons agree with each other. 
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The efficiency of the solution can be further enhanced by using V2V communication in a variety of 
ways. For example, caching and later relaying the data for other vehicles (that might not have been 
able to receive it due to error zone), relaying NAK to previous RSU (via vehicles traveling in 
opposite direction), using V2V communication as the reverse channel to send all the selective ACKs 
and NAKs, etc. 
The solution is best suited for request-response type of applications, where a small request is 
followed by a large response data (such as file transfer, multimedia download, etc). The solution 
does not provide continuous connectivity so interactive or continuous connectivity demanding 
applications, such as IP telephony cannot be supported. Also, the solution is not intended to 
support security based applications that are time critical and require large data flow from vehicles; 
however, non-time critical or broadcast nature of security applications are supported, for example, 
dissemination of certificate revocation lists, weather, local news, hazard conditions, or other security 






Figure 3.10: Simulated LMSC characteristics probabilities (a) Probability that number of consecutive 
good state is more than given number of states (b) Probability that number of consecutive bad state 














































































































































Figure 3.11: Comparison of simulated and analytical success probabilities (a) BaseLine and Repeated 
transmission (n = 2) (b) Forward error correction (α = 0.1, 0.2) (c) Error location prediction and 
avoidance (pd = 0.07, 0.08, 0.09) (d) Comparison between simulated results of baseline, repeated 











































































Figure 3.12: Comparison between baseline, repeated transmission (repeat once), forward error 
correction (Rate=0.10) and error location prediction & avoidance (Pd=0.9) architectures (a) 
Probability that the fraction f of file lost is ≤ given value (b) Probability that the normalized file 
transfer time t is ≤ given value. Note: transfer time has been normalized with mean transfer time of 
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CHAPTER 4 SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
The desired security attributes for VANET include authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-
repudiation, revocation and privacy. It is important to note that privacy is the most important 
attribute, but at the same time it is in conflict with other attributes thus complicating the design of 
VANET security architecture. 
The simplest security architecture is to assign a single permanent certificate to each vehicle, this 
ensures authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, revocation but not the privacy. To 
address privacy, basic architecture can be extended to use multiple temporary certificates (normally 
referred as pseudonyms) instead of one permanent certificate; this ensures privacy since pseudonyms 
cannot be linked with each other and to the user [1-6]. Different schemes for pseudonym-
management have been proposed to ensure unlink-ability. One such scheme is to issue pseudonyms 
in bulk to vehicles [1]; the vehicle can then use these to ensure privacy. The bulk pseudonyms based 
scheme requires a tamper-proof-device (TPD) to store the pseudonyms and perform cryptographic 
operations [1], since these pseudonyms may be used for malicious purposes such as Sybil attacks. 
The TPDs are expensive and need reloading with new pseudonyms when old ones expire or are 
used up.  
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Possible solutions can be to let vehicles generate pseudonyms themselves [2, 3] or periodically get 
new pseudonyms from some certificate servers [4, 5]; thus eliminating the need of TPD (given the 
pseudonyms/other-authenticating-credentials with overlapping validity are not generated in bulk). 
First option makes revocation very complex and difficult while second option makes privacy 
difficult to achieve (since certificate server can link various pseudonyms). Blind signature scheme [7], 
with some kind of link-ability, is usually employed to address privacy issues of second option [4, 5]. 
The process requires multiple-certificate-servers/multiple-transactions for one signature (i.e., for 
getting one pseudonym) and is thus difficult to realize, especially with an intermittent 
communication link with the infrastructure. Blind signature scheme is also used in [6], but the 
solution requires generation of authenticating-tokens in bulk thus needing TPD. 
Other architectures include those based on principles of group signatures and ID cryptography [8]. 
In case of group signatures, vehicles form part of a group with a trusted group manager. The 
architecture requires members to trust the group manager (who can find the true identity of signer), 
which will be difficult to achieve in a dynamic VANET. Further, size, membership revocation and 
dynamic membership (new nodes entering a group and old nodes leaving the group) increase the 
complexity and overheads of this method. 
The centralized certificate authority (CA) based solutions present a number of challenges which may 
be difficult to address during the initial deployment stages of VANET. The CAs must be organized 
in a hierarchical manner for effective management. The hierarchy can be area/location based; a 
given area (e.g., United States or Europe) can be divided into regions (e.g., states or countries) with 
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each region having its regional CA, these regional CAs are then linked with each other via a top level 
CA. Figure 4.1 shows a hierarchy with two regions.  
 
Figure 4.1: A certification authority hierarchy with two regional CAs. CA (Region 1) issues 
certificates to vehicles registered with in its region, for example certificate CV1 is issued to vehicle 
V1. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to vehicle y by a CA of region x.) 
The hierarchy can be extended both upwards and downwards. This means for vehicles to easily 
travel outside their CA’s domain, we need to establish a trust relationship among all certification 
authorities; thus certificate verification may take longer if the trust relationship goes through a long 
chain. Figure 4.2 shows possible steps taken for certificate verification when a vehicle from one 
region tries to communicate with a vehicle from another region (it assumed that none of the 
intermediate entities have previously cached certificates).  
Central Certification Authority - CA
CA (Region 1) – CA1






Figure 4.2: Certificate verification. (1) V2 sends a signed message along with its certificate to V1. V1 
does not have certificate CA2 in its cache and therefore cannot verify CV2. (2, 3) V1 asks for CA2 
from its regional CA via roadside unit. (4) Regional CA may have to ask central CA for the CA2. (5, 
6, 7) Certificate CA(CA2) is sent to V1 via regional CA and roadside unit. (8) V1 verifies the 
certificate CA2/CV2 and accepts the message. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to vehicle y by a 
CA of region x and dotted circle indicates a region.) 
Further, it also makes revocation difficult since revocation list (RL) must be distributed to all regions 
as vehicles are not restricted to remain within their regions. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of RL 
in case of two regional CAs. If pseudonyms are preloaded in TPDs then certificate revocation for a 
particular vehicle must include all the pseudonyms currently issued to (stored in) the vehicle. The RL 
may grow over time, making its distribution more difficult. 
1: CV2(M), CA2(CV2)
2: CA2 = ?
3: CA2 = ?












Figure 4.3: Distribution of certificate revocation list. (1) CA (Region 2) revokes certificate of a 
vehicle in its region, it distributes the revocation information within its region and also forwards it to 
central CA. (2) Central CA forwards revocation information to all regional CAs. (3) Each regional 
CA disseminates revocation information within its region. (Note: CAx(CVy) is a certificate issued to 
vehicle y by a CA of region x and circles indicate regions.) 
Each vehicle will have an associated certificate since its manufacture, this will be modified or 
updated each time the owner changes. These certificates will be expensive and it will also be 
technically difficult for an average user to keep track of the certificate renewal etc (even if he is not 
using the services). Further, in case of possible compromise, the revocation and issuance of new 
certificate may be quite cumbersome. 
In current designs, too much trust is placed on TPD, which stores all cryptographic materials 
(permanent certificate and pseudonyms), performs cryptographic operations (signing/verifying 
messages) and processes revocation messages/commands (erase keys/pseudonyms when revoked) 
[10]. Since the vehicle (and TPD) cannot be physically guarded as other electronic security devices 












(smart cards etc), those requirements will make the device quite expensive [14]. Further, the 
pseudonyms when exhausted must be reloaded thus requiring a periodic maintenance.  
The initial deployment stage of VANET will be characterized by limited infrastructure and small 
number of smart vehicles, which means very limited vehicle to vehicle and vehicle to infrastructure 
communication. During this stage, the solutions that assume omnipresence of these 
communications for certificate issuance, verification or revocation will not be practicable. Further, 
lack of infrastructure will discourage consumers’ participation and lack of consumers (smart 
vehicles) will discourage providers’ investment in infrastructure. 
In order to achieve the desired security attributes, two different distributed security architecture for 
VANET that do not rest on expensive security hardware or elaborate security infrastructure. are 
presented: 
 Service oriented security architecture: The architecture is based on spatial and temporal 
restricted certificates, which are issued upon user’s request and can be used for various 
VANET applications. Due to the restricted nature of these certificates, the certificate 
revocation process is simple and efficient. The architecture can be incrementally deployed, 
facilitating small companies to jump in the VANET business, and can fill the void during the 
VANET initial deployment phase. 
 General purpose security architecture: The security architecture uses revised Blind 
signature scheme. It provides “one-way-link-ability” that helps to achieve all the security 
attributes without introducing complex/multi-transaction procedures. It does not require 
expensive TPDs or complex pseudonym issuance/revocation procedures and is especially 
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suited to VANET during initial deployment phase which is characterized with intermittent 
connectivity. Further, non-repudiation/revocation requires cooperation between multiple 
entities thus ensuring privacy without a single point of failure. 
The chapter is organized in five sections. Section 4.1 discusses related research work in the field. 
Section 4.2 introduces the system model. Section 4.3 discusses the proposed service oriented 
security architecture. Section 4.4 discusses the proposed general purpose security architecture. And 
in the end, section 4.5 presents conclusion. 
4.1 Related Work 
Papadimitratos et al. [1, 10, 11] have presented a quite comprehensive solution based on 
central/regional certification authorities and their trust relationships. The solution uses pseudonyms 
to address privacy issues. The pseudonyms are preloaded in TPD [10] or issued by pseudonym 
provider [11] or generated by TPD and signed by CA [1]. They have also highlighted multiple 
revocation protocols. The solution requires the TPD, of the vehicle whose certificates have been 
revoked, to delete all stored pseudonyms and also assumes CA to have some knowledge about 
vehicles location. A malicious node may avoid this deletion by blocking the revocation message. 
This may enable him to use the pseudonyms later for communication with other vehicles. Other 
options are distribution of compressed RL or using bloom filters. TPD management through signed 
messages from CA may be exploited to evade revocation or for other malicious purposes such as 
DoS attacks (causing victim’s TPD to delete key material, etc). [1] leaves misbehavior detection on 
vehicle, between infrequent RL distributions.  
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The distribution of RL to all smart vehicle/regions is also a challenge. Papadimitratos et al. suggest 
restricting the scope of RL within a region, and requiring visiting nodes from other regions to obtain 
temporary certificates [15]. Thus a vehicle will have to acquire temporary certificates if it is travelling 
outside its registered region. 
In [2] Armknecht et al. propose a public key infrastructure where users derive public keys, 
certificates and pseudonyms. The architecture is based on elliptic curves, each user gets a master key 
and master certificate from CA. It can then generate its key pairs or certificate using masker key, 
master certificate and its own secret key. The certificate generated by user is verifiable by CA’s 
public key. For revocation the CA publishes some data, depending on which all nodes have to 
update their keys. The excluded nodes cannot update the keys based on this data. This means for 
each revocation everybody has to update their certificates. 
In [3] Fan et al. present detailed operation of public key infrastructure mechanism based on bilinear 
mapping. They achieve privacy through pseudonyms which are generated by users themselves 
similar to [2]. Revocation is accomplished through distribution of RL that is stored by each user. 
Every time a user receives a beacon it performs certain computations on complete RL to ensure that 
the received beacon is from unrevoked user. 
In [4] Rahman et al. present an automated crash reporting application. For privacy, they use Blind 
signature scheme to get anonymous credentials signed by local certification authority (government 
transportation authority -GTA) through a multiple transaction protocol. They achieve non-
repudiation by adding an invisible identity field in pseudonym. A vehicle’s unique identity (within a 
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GTA’s domain) is doubly encrypted (first by GTA’s public key then by local law enforcement 
authority’s public key) to get an invisible identity. They suggest using cut-and-choose method to 
ensure that blind messages are well formed, which has high overheads especially to confirm the 
invisible-identity. Further, the cut-and-choose method will reveal the identity of vehicle thus 
compromising privacy. 
In [8, 17] Lin et al. present a security mechanism using group signature and identity based signature 
techniques. The solution minimizes the storage at CA for later liability establishment, however the 
revocation is road side unit aided. CA sends RL to roadside unit which then monitors certificates in 
messages broadcasted by passing-by vehicles and if a message with revoked certificate is observed 
then roadside unit broadcasts warning messages. In another option it is suggested that each passing-
by vehicle get its certificate signed from roadside unit. These signatures are then used to show that 
the certificate has not been revoked. First option is open to attacks (malicious node does not 
transmit within range of a roadside unit) and second increases complexity and overhead. 
IEEE P1609.2 [9] proposes a CA based architecture. The architecture assumes pervasive roadside 
architecture and does not offer certificate revocation options. 
In [16] Parno et al. present detailed discussion on challenges faced by vehicular network, adversaries, 
attacks and propose a set of security primitives. They suggest a dynamic key distribution system, 
where each node generates its own short term key pair and requests CA to issue a certificate based 
on generated public key. They also suggest using group signatures to achieve anonymity. 
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Our general purpose security architecture comes closer to the method presented by [5, 6]. In [5], 
Fisher et al. used a large number of pseudonyms (defined as Inter-Vehicle-Communication-IVC 
certificates) to achieve un-link-ability. These pseudonyms are blindly signed by IVC certification 
servers’ (ICS) private key. The private signing key is shared amongst multiple ICS by means of 
Secret Sharing. An IVC certificate is distributedly calculated through a quorum of ICS. For non-
repudiation a tag, that can be linked to the vehicle, is generated/stored by ICS and is protected by a 
secret key shared amongst ICS. The solution requires transactions with multiple servers to get a 
pseudonym which may be difficult due to intermittent connectivity in VANET. Further, a 
pseudonym cannot be revoked during its validity period, and no definite solution to malformed 
pseudonyms (having validity larger than defined maximum period) has been defined. In [6], Schaub 
et al. also use pseudonyms to achieve un-link-ability. The pseudonyms are issued by pseudonym 
providers (PPk) based on V-tokens (that also later form part of pseudonyms), V-tokens cannot be 
linked to the each other or to the owner by PPk thus ensuring privacy. V-tokens, containing 
identifying information of the vehicle and Certification Authority (CA), are blindly signed by CA 
after being encrypted by vehicle with public key of resolution authority (RA). The decryption ability 
of V-tokens (i.e., resolution/non-repudiation) is distributed using threshold encryption scheme. The 
solution relies on cut-and-choose method to ensure well-form-ness of V-tokens, thus adding 
overheads in addition to the need of TPD (to store the V-tokens or corresponding pseudonyms). 
Further, the revocation method only revokes long-term identity and does not address already issued 
pseudonyms/V-tokens which may continue to be used for malicious purpose. 
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4.2 System Model 
4.2.1 Security Objectives 
VANET’s security requirements are more complex than other wired/wireless networks. In addition 
to basic security attributes of authentication, confidentiality and integrity, it also requires non-
repudiation, revocation and privacy. These additional security attributes are briefly discussed below:- 
 Non-repudiation: A user should not be able to later deny that she originated a message. It 
adds liability to user for the messages which she generates. This is especially important in 
case of VANET safety applications. If this requirement is not fulfilled then a malicious node 
may generate fake public safety message without any liability. 
 Revocation: Revocation of user’s credentials is also an important security attribute. It helps 
to minimize the damages if a user’s credentials are lost or a user engages in malicious activity.  
 Privacy: Privacy is one of the most important security attributes in VANET applications. 
This is due to the fact that VANET communication can be used to track a vehicle (driver) 
which causes great concerns to many users. Privacy comes in direct conflict with the other 
security attributes. One has to strike a balance between privacy protection and the other 
security attributes, especially non-repudiation.  
4.2.2 Threat Model 
We do not make very stringent security requirements for vehicle’s on-board device or restrict the 
capabilities of attacker node. We assume that an attacker is capable of: 
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 eavesdropping when within the routing path or in the transmission range of a message  
 injecting, modifying, spoofing or dropping the messages 
 trying to track the movement of another vehicle either alone or in collaboration with other 
mobile or fixed nodes (total number of such collaborating nodes will be a small fraction of 
all the nodes participating in the network since we assume that majority of nodes are honest) 
 taking complete control of her on-board device and also crafting any protocol related 
messages 
4.2.3 Desired Requirements 
Keeping in mind VANET characteristics, attacker capabilities and security attributes, our desired 
requirements for the proposed security architecture are:- 
 Ensure authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, revocation and privacy. 
 Guard against traceability by one or more collaborating entities. An attacker alone or with 
collaboration of limited other mobile or fixed nodes should not able to track a user. In other 
words, two messages from the same user should not be linkable (if desired). 
 Ensure privacy revocation involves multiple authorities. A single authority, by itself alone, 
should not be able to revoke the privacy of a user. Privacy revocation could only be achieved 
by cooperation of multiple identities. 
 Provide security without need of expensive TPDs, or large storage requirements at central 
authority/ RSU. 
 Guard against a user using legitimate pseudonyms for malicious purposes such as Sybil 
attack, etc. 
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 Do not require multiple transactions for various routine operations, such as certificate 
issuance, certificate revocation, etc. This is especially necessary due to the intermittent nature 
of connectivity of VANET. 
4.3 Service Oriented Security Architecture 
To address the security challenges during initial deployment stage, a distributed certificate 
architecture is proposed. This initial deployment stage will be characterized by very few smart 
vehicles and lack of necessary roadside infrastructure to support various VANET applications or 
elaborate security architecture. The proposed architecture achieves desired security attributes and 
enables service providers to incrementally offer various VANET services with minimal investment 
thus encouraging both service providers and users to try/adopt VANET. Certificates with a limited 
scope in both time and space domain are issued by a service provider. These certificates are usable 
within a particular geographic area or within a certain time or both. These certificates are not tied to 
the vehicle’s registration etc and can be changed periodically during one service period. Meanwhile 
law enforcement agencies can trace back the user via the temporary certificate and the service 
provider. 
4.3.1 Assumptions 
Our solution is based on a few simple assumptions given below: 
 The user/node (we use user/node/vehicle interchangeably) has a payment-processing-
device (similar to automatic toll payment devices - sold for tens of dollars). We do not 
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require the device to store pseudonyms, perform cryptographic operations (such as 
signing/verifying messages) or perform revocation operation. The device only participates 
in credential/service request operations (discussed later). 
 The user/node has a wireless-communication/VANET-application device that can 
communicate with roadside infrastructure; it can be a laptop or a hand-held device or a 
device specially designed for smart vehicles. The device can communicate 
(wired/wireless/WiFi/Bluetooth) with the payment-processing-device. 
 Limited local roadside units are available (the existing hotspots in urban areas may be used 
for this purpose) and service providers can be accessed through these roadside units.  
4.3.2 Basic Solution 
The basic solution only caters for the provision of temporary credentials so that the required security 
attributes are achieved. These temporary credentials (pseudonyms) can then be used for basic 
vehicle to vehicle communication or participation in VANET safety application (such as 
initiating/relaying safety information). 
The basic idea is that if a user wants to participate in a VANET (the user’s vehicle is not required to 
have a manufacturer’s issued certificate), he purchases a payment-processing-device (As mentioned 
above, it is assumed that user also has a VANET application device, which is running desired 
VANET applications). Each device will have an identification and an associated certificate. During 
initialization the device will be linked/registered with the user’s account. The user’s information will 
be maintained with the provider and will not be stored in the device. The basic procedure is 
101 
illustrated in Figure 4.4. When a user enters a service area and wants to use the service, he makes the 
payment for the service using onboard payment device. The payment-authorization/service-request 
message will be encrypted using the provider’s public key, thus hiding the device ID/certificate and 
services requested from eavesdroppers. The user is issued a pseudonym by the provider that will be 
valid for a given period/area.  
 
Figure 4.4: Architecture (1) Users register their payment devices with Provider beforehand (2) Users 
send payment/service requests (3) Provider issues temporary credentials (4) Users participate in 
VANET via vehicle to vehicle or vehicle to infrastructure communication. 
We define several notations/functions that we will use in the formal description of our solution. A 
certificate or a pseudonym will essentially be represented by its public and private key pair; such as 
),(  xx KK  are public (+) and private (-) keys belonging to X. ),( fs tt  are the start and finish times 
between which a particular pseudonym (P) will be valid. A certificate can be valid inside a service 
area; service areas can be defined with region numbers R, large service areas may have more than 










purchase the certificate. )(ME
K 
 defines an encryption function on message M using the public key 
K . Public cryptography is very resource intensive therefore data encryption is usually carried out 
using a randomly generated symmetric session key and only the session key is encrypted using public 
cryptography. The encryption function )(ME
K 
 defined above employs similar techniques; we will 
not show the details for simplicity and compactness. NMS
K
 )( , defines a signature function on 
message M using a private key 
K . The signatures are computed by first creating a message digest 
using a hashing function and then encrypting the digest using key K . ),( NMV
K 
is a signature 
verification function. It has two inputs the message M and the signature N. It verifies the signature 
by computing the message digest of message M and comparing it with received signatures N (after 
decrypting it with the corresponding public key K ). 
If a user U having a public key pair ),(  UU KK  (for initial request these are the permanent keys 
associated with the payment-processing device) wants to acquire temporary credentials for the time 
duration defined by ),( fs tt  and within the region R from a service provider S with a public key pair
),(  SS KK , Figure 4.5 shows the transactions. 
4.3.3 Extended Services 
The solution can be easily extended for extended/additional services. If additional VANET services 
or applications are available (such as multimedia content, web access, email etc) then these can be 
offered as extended services. In this case a user indicates the service which he desires to 
use/purchase in service request/payment authorization message. The payment processing provider 
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issues the temporary credentials to the user and also forwards these credentials along with the details 
of service purchased to the concerned server. The user can then initiate request to the concerned 
server for service using issued temporary credentials. Figure 4.6 shows such a scenario. The 
Extended services will include the basic service (basic service only provides pseudonym). 
1 :U  Generate },,,{ URttM fs  
Compute )(MEM
sK
R   
Compute )(MSN
UK
R   
2 :SU   
RR NM ,  
3 :S  Extract M  
),( RK NMV U
 a 
Verify ID U and associated account 
Generate },,,{  Pfs KRttP ,

PK   
b 




P   
Compute )(  PKK KSN S
 
4 :US  
KPP NNM ,,  
5 :S  Extract P  and PK  
),( PK NPV S
, ),( KPK NKV S

  
a The service provider records device’s public key during user/device registration/initialization process. 
b P is the pseudonym/temporary certificate with associated private key 
PK  
Figure 4.5: Transactions between User U and Provider S to acquire temporary credential
},,,,{  PPfs KKRtt ; valid for time duration defined by ),( fs tt  and within region R. User uses (P, NP) as 
a temporary certificate. 
It is not necessary that the payment-processing provider is also operating the application servers; 
these servers can be operated by other providers. In this case, the payment-processing provider 
provides temporary credentials and processes the payments on behalf of other providers; similar to 
credit card providers. 
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Figure 4.6: Extended services architecture (1) User registers payment device with Credential provider 
(2) User sends payment/service request (3) Credential provider issues temporary credentials (4) 
Credential provider informs Server of service purchased and temporary credentials (5) User requests 
service using temporary credentials (6) Server delivers content. 
4.3.4 Provision of Privacy 
The privacy is one of the most important security attributes in VANET. The proposed solution 
provides this through pseudonyms which cannot be linked to the user ID. For additional privacy the 
pseudonyms can be refreshed within one service period. There are two possible options for this; the 
pseudonyms are issued in bulk at the time of purchase or a new pseudonym is issued sometime 
before the expiry of the old pseudonym. 
In case of bulk issuance of pseudonyms there are a few aspects to be considered. The number of 
pseudonyms is related to time period for which the service has been purchased and desired level of 
privacy (i.e. how often the pseudonyms are changed). (We are not considering the exact time period 
or methodology for changing pseudonyms; this has been studied in detail by other researchers [1, 











overlapping validity periods, they may be used for Sybil attacks. Although each pseudonym can be 
traced back to the user via a payment-processing-provider, this can only be done by law 
enforcement/government agencies and not by ordinary users. Another important aspect is the 
length and number of messages that are required to send these pseudonyms to the user/server and 
also the storage requirement at server/user device. If the pseudonyms are sent in one or multiple 
continuous messages, a malicious server (not the credential provider) may be able to link the 
pseudonyms and compromise user’s privacy. For this reason, the credential provider should first 
mix/group the pseudonyms of different users (that will be served by same server) with each other 
and then send them to a service provider. User’s applications also need to be careful about changing 
the pseudonyms to ensure security and uninterrupted service, for example not changing a 
pseudonym within a transaction or between multiple transactions that can be linked based on 
context (accessing one’s email). 
In case of single issuance of pseudonym the most important aspect is to ensure that the user gets 
new pseudonym before the expiry of current one. There are two options for this, either the user 
initiates request for a new pseudonym before the expiry of current one or the server maintains state 
for each user and issues a new pseudonym before the expiry of current pseudonym. Letting users 
initiate requests is more practicable since it will save server’s resources and the complexity of 
message delivery (the user can initiate request anywhere within the service area).  
Besides certificates (pseudonym) other IDs (such as IP address, MAC address etc) are also important 
to hide in ensuring privacy [21, 22]. These IDs can be issued on temporary basis and refreshed 
several times during a service period similar to pseudonyms.  
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The certificate of CA (also the payment-processing-provider) is hard coded in the payment device, 
enabling other users to check the validity of a certificate.  
4.3.5 Practicability 
The proposed solution is incremental, practicable and requires minimal infrastructure, which is 
especially advantageous during the initial deployment phase of VANET. The payment-processing-
device does not need to have many functionalities or high processing power or large storage. It is 
similar to toll-payment-devices which are commonly being used and can be purchased for tens of 
dollars. 
The payment-processing-device is not tied to a particular vehicle so a user is free to transfer it from 
one vehicle to another. The payment-processing provider is similar to credit card providers; we are 
using the mature Internet-like payment-processing architecture which is considered to be secure. 
The application servers can be installed by different operators and existing hot spots in urban areas 
may be initially used to test the architecture. 
Software can be developed for laptops and handheld devices to participate in different VANET 




The proposed architecture ensures desired security attributes. Authentication and confidentiality can 
be achieved by signing/encrypting the messages using associated public keys. Attacker cannot link 
the pseudonyms with a user; even different pseudonyms cannot be linked with each other, thus 
ensuring privacy. Meanwhile, liability can be enforced with the help of payment processing provider, 
since it has the account information for each issued pseudonym. 
The architecture, as opposed to existing solutions, does not require users to maintain permanent 
(long-term) or valid temporary certificates when they are not using the service; user purchases a 
certificate only when he/she wants to use the service. The architecture also simplifies the certificate 
revocation; certificates automatically expire after their validation time or beyond the predefined 
service area. For each new issuance of a certificate the provider checks if a previous certificate for 
the same user was revoked (each user account has an associated revocation flag that indicates 
whether a previous certificate of user was revoked or not. The provider can reset the flag if the user 
later clears the cause of revocation). If a revocation entry exists then new certificate will not be 
issued. Further, if the certificate is to be revoked before its expiry then revocation list (RL) can be 
disseminated via roadside units. Since the service is area/time restricted so the RL will be distributed 
only within the affected area and will contain only the certificates which have still not expired (due 
to time). This simplifies RL maintenance and distribution.  
The system does not require centralized CA or trust relationships among regional CAs. Each 
provider can work independently within its coverage area. This minimizes the infrastructure required 
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by a service provider to start its services and will be an incentive for service providers and facilitate 
small companies jumping into the VANET industry. Initially, a service provider may limit its service 
within a geographic area and later incrementally extend it. Further, when isolated/widely-separated 
service areas become adjacent, due to the extensions, then they can be combined as one region or 
roaming can be coordinated between the regions. Users and providers both benefit with incremental 
deployment without paying unnecessarily for the services they do not use or sell. The solution does 
not require expensive tamper proof devices and periodic refilling of pseudonyms. A user only pays 
when using the service and does not pay for certificate maintenance. 
Payment devices may be operated by a third party and integrated with service providers; one device 
may be used by different service providers. Further, development of payment device will be 
motivated by service providers, who will force security and affordability of the devices. The 
architecture derives its security from the mature Internet payment systems. 
As a baseline service, the temporary credentials can be used for all VANET applications including 
vehicle to vehicle communications. Further, our solution can coexist with the solutions that are 
based on the certificate authority and changing pseudonyms (such as [1-3, 9]), therefore smart 
vehicles equipped with TPDs and vehicles using our solution can coexist and make use of the 
service provided by the providers. This ensures smooth transition and unlimited overlapping of both 
solutions. 
The certificates can be used for other cryptographic primitives, such as session keys between users, 
group keys within area for broadcast/multicast of a particular service etc. The solution can guard 
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against Sybil attacks, since one payment processing device will be issued one certificate, if more than 
one payment device is used then it is possible, but the attacker has to pay for the Sybil node also. 
4.4 General Purpose Security Architecture 
The security architecture is based on revised Blind scheme. The architecture satisfies required 
security attributes by using carefully-designed pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are refreshed by 
vehicles via Roadside Units (RSUs) using revised Blind signature scheme. To refresh pseudonyms, a 
vehicle uses its previous valid certificate to authenticate its blinded pseudonym-signature-request 
message to a passing-by RSU. The RSU generates/stores a tag/link based on its received blinded 
pseudonym-signature-request message and the certificate that was used to authenticate the message. 
The tag/link helps to ensure non-repudiation and certificate revocation. It does not require multiple 
sessions or multiple RSUs to generate this tag/link. The original Blind signature scheme has been 
modified by enforcing a condition on the blinding factor; this also helps to guard against other 
attacks towards the original Blind signature scheme (discussed later). It does not generate 
pseudonyms, with overlapping validity, in bulk which must be guarded against malicious use by 
user/attacker (e.g., by storing these in a TPD). The non-overlapping pseudonyms or other long term 
certificates (that may exist at any time) can be securely stored without need of TPD by employing 
methods that are currently being used in securing certificates in personal computers/servers. The 
architecture satisfies all security attributes without requiring expensive TPDs or complex multi-step 
transactions with multiple certificate servers. The architecture does not require users to trust a party 
with their private/secret keys and thus will have more user acceptance. Further, non-
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repudiation/revocation requires cooperation between multiple entities thus ensuring privacy without 
a single point of failure. 
4.4.1 Basic Blind Signature - Introduction 
Blind signature scheme was first introduced by Chaum [7]. It makes use of multiplicative property of 
RSA (discussed below). Blind signature scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography can be used 
interchangeably; we will restrict ourselves to RSA based scheme only. 
Entity A wants to get message m blindly signed by entity B; m could be hash of some message M. 
Note that the entity A may need to prove to entity B that it is entitled to receive blind signatures. 
The authentication could be done using some token or signatures on message m. The details of 
authentication are omitted, since it is not essential to the basic concept of Blind signatures. The 
Blind signature scheme is shown in Figure 4.7. 
Given m, s and public parameters, the signatures are valid if y = m; where y = (s)e = (md) e = m mod n. 
The Blind signature scheme can be used to certify pseudonyms; but it raises many security issues, 
such as: 
 There is no way to ensure non-repudiation and certificate revocation, since newly signed 
pseudonyms cannot be linked to authenticator/node (i.e., given <m, s> it is not possible to 
construct m' (i.e., blinded m) or a link to authenticator of m'). 
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 The signed pseudonyms may be used to launch Sybil attacks, and we cannot deal with it 
since there is no way to link pseudonyms with each other or with the true identity of the 
node. 
 A node with valid authenticator may share its pseudonyms with another node that does not 
have a valid authenticator and who is unable to get pseudonyms. 
A: 1. Generate random number r: gcd (r, n)=1 
 2. Compute blinding factor bf:  bf = r
e 
 3. Blind message m to m' :  m' = bf m = (r
e m) mod n 
A → B: 4. m' 
B: 5. Sign message m' using private key d: x = (m')d mod n 
B → A: 6. x 
A: 7. Recover message signature: s = md = r-1(x)mod n 
 8. r-1(x)mod n = r-1(m')d mod n= r-1(re m)d mod n  
= r-1r md mod n = md mod n 
Figure 4.7: Basic Blind signature scheme (public key parameters: n, e = public key of B and d= secret 
key of B).  
4.4.2 Proposed Architecture 
The architecture uses a certificate chain consisting of long-term and short-term certificates. Initially, 
a long-term certificate is used to get the initial short-term certificate and later a new short-term 
certificate can be obtained based on the previous short-term certificate, thus making a certificate 
chain (details discussed later in this section). We have revised the Blind signature scheme to meet 
our requirements of non-repudiation and revocation. 
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4.4.2.1 Notations and Function Definitions 
We define several notations and functions which we will use in formal description of our 
architecture. A certificate or pseudonym Certx is essentially defined by its associated identification 
IDx and key pair (Px , Sx); public key Px forms part of certificate and secret key Sx is known only to 
the holder of Certx. Sig-Certx (M)=N, is a signature function on message M using key Sx or certificate 
Certx. The signature N is computed by first creating a message digest (Mh = Hash(M)) using some 
well known hashing function (such as SHA1) and then encrypting the digest using key Sx. VerSig-
Certx (M, N), is a signature verification function with two inputs: the message M and the signature N. 
It verifies the signature by computing the message digest of message M and comparing it with 
received signature N (after decrypting it with the corresponding public key Px). Note that knowledge 
of Certx is needed for function VerSig-Certx (M, N). Certx should either be publicly available or 
attached along with the Sig-Certx (M). In the rest of the chapter it is assumed that Certx is either 
publicly available or attached along with the Sig-Certx (M), and will not be explicitly mentioned. 
4.4.2.2 Proposed Revised Blind Signature Scheme 
In order to address the security issues of the original Blind signature scheme and to satisfy our 
security objectives, we revised Blind signature scheme (Figure 4.8). Our proposed scheme achieves 
one-way-link-ability, i.e., given a blinded pseudonym (m') the signer cannot find the un-blinded 
pseudonym (m), but given a certificate (<un-blinded pseudonym -m, signatures -s>) the signer can 
construct the associated blinded pseudonym (m') and find a link to its authenticator (authenticator of 
m'). One-way-link-ability ensures privacy since the signer, at the time of signing signatures, cannot 
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determine the pseudo-credentials. Whereas for revocation/non-repudiation (given the pseudonym), 
it is possible to construct the chain/link leading to the node’s true identity. 
V: 1. Generate Certi = < IDi , Pi > and   Si ;   
IDi = bf = r
e ; where IDi is pseudo ID,  
Pi and Si are public and secret keys of V. 
 2. Compute mi = Hash (Certi) 
 3. Compute mi' = bf mi = IDi mi = (r
e mi) mod n 
V → R: 4. mi', Ti  , Sig-Certi-1 (mi'), Certi-1 
R: 5. Verify Certi-1 for time-period validity and revocation.  
(details in certificate revocation) 
 6. VerSig-Certi-1 (mi', Sig-Certi-1 (mi')) 
 7. Compute x =(mi')
d mod n 
 8. Store link <mi', Ti , Certi-1> or alternatively 
< mi', Ti , mi-1' > 
R → V: 9. x, Ti , Sig-CertR (Ti)  
V: 10. Recover certificate signature  Sig-CertR (Certi ): 
Sig-CertR (Certi ) = s = (mi)
d = r-1(x) mod n 
 11. Use <Certi , Ti , Sig-CertR(Certi), Sig-CertR(tn),  CertR>  
as new credentials 
Figure 4.8: Proposed revised Blind signature scheme – initial version (public key parameters: n, e = 
public key of R, d = secret key of R). 
Suppose that vehicle V has a current certificate Certi-1 which is valid for time period Ti-1 (time period 
defines a start and an end time) and now needs to get a new certificate Certi valid for time period Ti 
from a nearby RSU R (Figure 4.8). V generates Certi (step 1), blinds the certificate using public 
credentials of RSU R (steps 2, 3), authenticates the blind-signature-request-message with Certi-1 and 
sends the request to the RSU (step 4). RSU R verifies validity of Certi-1 (step 5), verifies signatures on 
request (step 6), generates/stores the tag/link (steps 7, 8) and sends signed message to V (step 9). V 
un-blinds the message to get the signatures on pseudonyms (step 10) and then uses the pseudonym 
as required (step 11), but makes sure to not use Certi with R.  
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The solution ensures one-way-link-ability to achieve non-repudiation/revocation: Certi cannot be 
generated from mi', but mi' can be generated from Certi and mi' can be linked to Certi-1. Note that 
revocation/non-repudiation cannot be accomplished by a single signing RSU (or a few RSUs); it 
requires cooperation between all involved RSUs to reconstruct the chain/link iteratively. The utility 
of one-way-link-ability rests on the assumption that a node should not declare (use) the un-blinded 
pseudonym to (with) the RSU who issued signatures on its blinded version. 
The solution shares a limitation with Blind signature scheme, i.e., the signer cannot ensure that the 
blinded message (certificate) is well-formed (constructed as per agreed protocol/scheme). 
Specifically the RSU cannot ensure bf =IDi . One commonly used solution is to use cut-and-choose 
method [4, 6]. Here the user sends multiple certificates to the signer (e.g., user sends two blinded 
messages, if she wants to get signatures on one); the signer can then choose which half to sign and 
the user un-blinds the other half for the signer to check if these were well-formed or not. This 
reduces the success probability of attacks by malicious users but at the same time adds considerable 
overhead, which is not affordable in the face of intermittent connectivity in VANET environment. 
In order to address this vulnerability, we have further refined the Blind signature scheme. The 
modifications are given in Figure 4.9 (only shows the several revised steps in the initial proposed 
approach given in Figure 4.8). 
Sig-CertR (mi'H || Ti) is the modified Blind signature, which serves three purposes: attaching a 
certificate-valid-time-period condition to the signature, adding link-ability to the certificate for later 
non-repudiation/revocation purpose, and guarding against malicious use of the signature 
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(malforming the blind message, changing ID to make certificate un-linkable, sharing the signed 
certificate, etc ). 1 
 
R: 7. Compute mi'H= Hash (mi') 
 8. Store link <mi' H, Ti , Certi-1> or alternatively 
< mi'H , Ti , mi-1'H > 
R → V: 9. mi'H , Ti , Sig-CertR (mi'H || Ti) ; 
 x||y is concatenation of x and y.  
V: 10. Use <Certi , Ti , Sig-CertR(mi'H || Ti),  CertR>  
as new credentials 
Figure 4.9: Proposed revised Blind signature scheme – final version. 
4.4.3 System Setup  
Three types of certificates have been defined: permanent certificates, long-term/daily certificates, 
and short-term/temporary certificates (i.e., pseudonyms) (Figure 4.10). Each vehicle will have a 
permanent certificate that is registered with a Central Certification authority (CCA) similar to vehicle 
registration authority. The CCA can be state or country based and its operational area is divided into 
regions, with each region having a Regional Certification Authority (RCA). A vehicle on entering a 
region registers itself with the RCA; RCA in turn updates the vehicle’s current region information on 
CCA (the update only takes place when a vehicle moves from one region to another). Either RCA or 
CCA can confirm that the permanent certificate of vehicle has not been previously revoked. This 
helps to target the revocation to concerned regions only, and hence, simplifies revocation and 
                                                 
1 To guard against blind decryption or blind signatures on some other message besides certificates, certification servers 
will have different certificates for signing and encrypting other messages. 
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reduces certificate revocation list (CRL) size. The size of a region depends on the desired privacy 
granularity. 
A vehicle gets one long-term certificate per day from RCA using proposed Blind signature scheme. 
RCA stores the relevant link. One long-term certificate per day reduces the chain size which makes 
revocation simple. A vehicle uses this long-term certificate to get its first short-term certificate (of 
the day) from an RSU, using the proposed modified Blind signature scheme. The RSU stores the 
relevant link/tag in its database and informs RCA (via a confirmation message) that a short-term 
certificate has been issued based on a particular long-term certificate. The RCA modifies the 
freshness/used bit associated with the record. If later the RCA receives another certificate-issue-
confirmation-message for the same long-term certificate, it marks the vehicle as malicious and takes 
appropriate measures such as certificate revocation. RSUs can use mi'H instead of un-blinded long-
term certificate in confirmation message to further ensure privacy. 
For each subsequent certificate, the vehicle uses its previous/last short-term certificate to 
authenticate its current request. The issuing/signing RSU in this case sends a confirmation message 
to the RSU who issued/signed the previous short-term certificate. The RSU who issued/signed the 
previous short-term certificate then modifies the freshness/used flag associated with the record. 
This ensures that more than one certificate are not issued based on one particular short-term 
certificate. The time period of the new certificate will be non-overlapping and later than the 
validation period of the previous certificate. 
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Figure 4.10: Certificate Architecture: CCA maintains current RCA and permanent certificate to 
owner link, RCA maintains permanent certificate to blinded-long-term certificate link and RSU that 
reported usage of long-term certificate, each RSU maintains authenticating-certificate (and its issuer) 
to blinded-short-term certificate link and the RSU that reported usage of issued short-term 
certificate. 
The issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate (Certi-1) while modifying the 
freshness/used bit may also record the RSU which has sent the confirmation message. This will 
simplify revocation process (discussed later in Section 4.4.4) but will also raise limited privacy issues 
since the RSU knows the link to the next RSU as well as the previous RSU. Note that even with this 
knowledge a single RSU cannot compromise the privacy of a vehicle; it still needs cooperation from 
other RSUs, though in this case it knows the RSUs with which it should cooperate. 
We require RSUs to send certificate-issue-confirmation-message to issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of 
authenticating certificate (Certi-1). This ensures that no more than one pseudonym with 
same/overlapping validity will be issued. For this goal, the RSU sends certificate-issue-confirmation-
message to the issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate (Certi-1) and waits for a 
timeout before signing new pseudonym. Issuer/signer (RCA/RSU) of authenticating certificate 
Central Certification Authority - CCA
CA (Region 1) – RCA1
CA (Region N) – RCAN
RCAx CertPerm- Vi Owner-Vi
R1 mL'H CertPerm- Vi
Ri+1 mi'H mi-1'H Ri-1
RSUs
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(Certi-1) responds within the timeout period only if malicious activity is detected. This ensures 
desired security with minimum overhead. 
4.4.4 Security Attributes 
Confidentiality, integrity, and authentication can be achieved by using short-term certificates for 
signatures and/or encryption. Rest of the security attributes are discussed below: 
4.4.4.1 Privacy 
The solution ensures privacy since the RCA/RSUs do not know the ID and public keys of a vehicle 
at the time of signing the blinded certificate. Further, since a vehicle gets a short-term certificate 
from one RSU and uses it later with another RSU, a single RSU cannot link different short-term 
certificates of a particular vehicle. Tracing is possible but quite difficult for attackers, which can be 
achieved only when all the RSUs that issued certificates to a particular vehicle cooperate with each 
other. Even if attackers can trace a vehicle in this way, the true ID of a vehicle cannot be determined 
without the help from RCA. Also, RCA by itself cannot compromise the privacy of the vehicle. This 
property improves users’ confidence since even the government authority itself cannot compromise 
user privacy---government authority must get cooperation from commercial operators who operate 
the RSUs in order to trace a vehicle and its user. 
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4.4.4.2 Non-repudiation (Liability) 
If a malicious message, signed by a particular certificate, has been identified then the privacy of 
signer can be revoked with the cooperation between RCA and RSUs. The signed message will 
contain the information < Certi , Ti , Sig-CertRn (mi'H || Ti), CertRn>. It is assumed that the certificate 
and signatures on the malicious message are valid, since if the certificate is not valid then the 
message will be discarded and there will be no need of revocation. The revocation is performed 
backwards iteratively as following (refer to Figure 4.11): 
 RSU – Rn will generate mn'H , locate the record and find corresponding Certn-1. 
 It will then forward the revocation request to RSU-Rn-1 which issued Certn-1. 
 The chain will be followed till first RSU and then RCA which will reveal the true ID of 
malicious vehicle (based on long-term certificate). 
  
Figure 4.11: Non-repudiation procedure: (1) Law enforcement forwards the short-term certificate 
under investigation to CCA, (2) CCA forwards the blinded-short-term certificate to the concerned 
RSU, (3,4) RSUs iteratively forward the blinded-authenticating-short-term certificate to its issuing 
RSU, (5) RSU forwards the blinded-long-term certificate to RCA, (6) RCA forwards corresponding 
permanent certificate to CCA, (7) CCA provides the ownership information to requesting Law 
enforcement authority.  
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4.4.4.3 Certificate Revocation 
There may be a situation when the certificates of a particular vehicle are to be revoked. It is 
important to note that the majority of vehicles will be honest and certificate revocation will not be 
routine so the proposed protocol has been designed to minimize overheads in normal situations. 
The certificate revocation decision may be made at CCA based on either request of user (for stolen 
credentials) or law enforcement (for malicious use). The detail of decision methodology is out of 
scope and will not be discussed. The CCA will inform the RCA of the region where the vehicle last 
registered. Revocation is processed iteratively along the certificate chain in forward direction as 
following (Figure 4.12): 
 RCA will check to see if the vehicle has already used its long-term certificate (to get short-
term certificate from some RSU) or not. If the vehicle did not get any short-term certificate 
then RCA will revoke long-term certificate by broadcasting revocation command 
containing the hash of the blinded long-term certificate (mi'H). RSUs will not issue first 
short-term certificate based on this long-term certificate. The certificate revocation 
command will expire after the validity of long-term certificate.  
 If the vehicle has used its long-term certificate to get the short-term certificate then the 
RCA will broadcast revocation command to all RSUs containing hash of corresponding 
blinded short-term certificate (mi'H). Note if the RCA maintains the ID of RSU that issued 
the first short-term certificate (based on confirmation message sent by the RSU) then the 
revocation command is only needed to be sent to the single RSU that issued the first short-
term certificate.  
 The RSU that issued the first short-term certificate will find the link and broadcast the 
revocation command containing hash of corresponding blinded short-term certificate 
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(mi'H). RSU may also acknowledge to the RCA. The broadcast may be limited to a few hops 
since it is likely that vehicle would have got the next short-term certificate from some RSU 
in geographical proximity of the first RSU. The broadcast range may be expanded if no 
RSU acknowledges. Similarly if RSUs maintain the ID of the next RSU in certificate chain 
then revocation message may be sent directly to the concerned RSU. 
 The revocation broadcast ends at the last RSU that issued the short-term certificate, the 
RSU then broadcasts revocation message containing hash of current blinded short-term 
certificate (mi'H). Other RSUs will not issue any new certificate based on this short-term 
certificate and will also not trust any message signed by this certificate. RSUs may also 
broadcast hash of current blinded short-term certificate (mi'H) to vehicles in the limited 
region (the limit can be defined) within the validity time period of certificate. 
  
Figure 4.12: Revocation Procedure: (1) Law enforcement authority forwards ownership information, 
(2) CCA forwards the permanent certificate to concerned RCA for revocation, (3) RCA forwards the 
blinded-long-term certificate to concerned RSU, (4,5) RSUs iteratively forward the blinded-short-
term certificate to next RSU that reported its usage as authenticating certificate (6) Last RSU 
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Two different security architectures have been presented to address the security challenges during 
initial deployment stage of VANET. The service oriented security architecture can be incrementally 
deployed. Users are issued with temporary certificates which can only be used within a specific 
geographic area and within a particular time period. This property also simplifies the certificate 
revocation procedure. A framework has been presented which can be used to provide various 
services to VANET by providers without investing much in infrastructure. The solution is intended 
to stimulate people’s interest in VANET and build user/provider confidence. The general purpose 
security architecture is based on revised Blind signature scheme. The Blind signature scheme has 
been revised to ensure provision of all the security attributes. The solution does not require tamper-
proof-devices or multiple interactive transactions. Non-repudiation/revocation requires cooperation 
between multiple entities thus ensuring privacy without a single point of failure.  
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CHAPTER 5 OPTIMAL PLACEMENT OF RSUs 
A vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) relies on three types of communication for its setup and 
provision of services: vehicle to vehicle (V2V) communication, vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) 
communication and infrastructure to infrastructure (I2I) communication. All VANET applications 
depend on either one or more of these communication types. V2V communication depends on the 
number and location of vehicles, V2I communication depends on the number and location of 
roadside units (RSUs) and I2I communication depends on availability of interconnecting network 
between RSUs. Most of the VANET applications collect/disseminate information from/to vehicles. 
The collection/dissemination of this information from/to vehicles takes place via roadside units 
(RSUs). The effectiveness of this information flow depends on connection time/bandwidth. 
Connection time, between vehicles and RSUs, can easily be improved by pervasive deployment of 
RSUs. However, this is an expensive solution and will especially not be feasible during the initial 
stages of VANET, when there will be very small number of vehicles and RSUs due to the low 
market penetration of VANET-enabled vehicles or due to the deployment cost of RSUs. There is, 
therefore a need to optimally place these RSUs in a given region/scenario in order to achieve 
maximum performance. 
The optimal placement of RSUs is strongly correlated to the type of environment i.e., along 
highways or urban areas. We have therefore, considered the problem of optimal placement of RSUs 
along highways or in urban areas separately with corresponding solutions. For optimal placement of 
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RSUs along highways, we present a balloon optimization method (that uses balloon expansion 
analogy to find optimal solution) and have compared it with an analytical optimization method (that 
uses brute force to find optimal solution). For optimal placement of RSUs in urban areas, we 
present two different solutions: Binary Integer Programming (BIP) method and a novel Balloon 
Expansion Heuristic (BEH) method. BIP method utilizes branch and bound method to find optimal 
solution, whereas, BEH method uses balloon expansion analogy to find optimal solution. 
The focus is on applications that collect information, such as information about road conditions, 
traffic conditions or traffic accident, from vehicles to nearby RSU system. We have incorporated the 
vehicle density, vehicle speed, and the occurrence likelihood of an incident/event in our 
optimization schemes. The optimization goal is to minimize the average reporting time for all 
possible information reports in a local region; reporting time is defined as the time duration from 
occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The proposed optimization schemes 
can easily be extended to applications that disseminate information, here the optimization goal can 
be the area covered within some time bounds. 
The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 5.1 discusses the related research work. Section 
5.2 discusses optimal placement of RSUs along highways. Section 5.3 discusses optimal placement of 
RSUs in Urban areas. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
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5.1 Related Work 
Earlier works in optimal placement in VANET include [3-11]. Lee et al. [3] seek optimal placement 
of RSUs to improve connectivity. Each intersection is considered as a potential RSU location. These 
potential locations are then ordered based on number of vehicle-reports received within 
communication range of each RSU. The vehicle-reports are based on per minute locations reported 
by taxis to telematics system. RSUs’ locations are then selected from this ordered list. The placement 
scheme only considers taxi location reports and does not consider speed or density of all vehicles. It, 
therefore, may not be able to achieve optimal connectivity for all vehicles.  
Li et al. [4] consider the optimal placement of gateways, which connect RSUs (access points - AP) to 
the Internet, while minimizing the average number of hops from APs to gateways. They consider 
pervasive APs such that every vehicle is connected to an AP. They do not consider vehicle speed, 
density or movement patterns.  
Zhao et al. [5] optimize placement of Thowboxes, standalone units that act as relays, to improve 
contact and data-rate/throughput within context of a delay tolerant network. They aim at improving 
V2V communication and not the V2I communication.  
Lochert et al. [6] use genetic algorithm for optimal placement of RSUs for a VANET traffic 
information system. They use a hierarchical aggregation scheme to share traffic information among 
vehicles and the optimal placement is aimed at minimizing the travel time based on this information 
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sharing. The optimal placement is to minimize travel for some fixed landmarks and may not be 
useful for travel between any two points in an area.  
Sun et al. [7] optimize the location of RSUs such that vehicles can reach an RSU within some timing 
constraint, given by sum of driving time and an overhead time (for adjusting the route), to update 
short term certificates. The optimization scheme may require vehicles to change their route which 
may have effects on local traffic condition. We do not have any route changing condition; we 
optimally place the RSUs considering the vehicles current routes only.  
Fiore et al. [8] optimally place RSUs (Access Points - AP) in an urban environment to improve 
cooperative download of data among vehicles. They aim at placing the APs at a point where 
maximum vehicles cross each other, this helps in relaying the data from AP to a downloading 
vehicle via other vehicles. Trullols et al. [9] optimally deploy RSUs (Dissemination Points – DPs) in 
an urban area to maximize the number of vehicles that contact the DPs. They also consider a second 
case where, in addition to the number of vehicles that contact DPs, the contact times of vehicles are 
also taken into consideration. Malandrino et al. [10] optimally deploy the RSUs (APs) to maximize 
the system throughput. They consider both the V2I (or I2V) and V2V communications for optimal 
placement of APs. Vehicle trajectory information (time and location) forms basis of this 
optimization which may not be available in many cases. Zheng et al. [11] optimally deploy APs to 
improve contact opportunity; defined in terms of time for which a user remains in contact with an 
AP. A moving user may connect with different APs during different times whereas; we only 
consider the time it takes for the vehicle to report an incident to first RSU it encounters. These 
optimizations aims at transfer of data from RSUs to vehicles whereas, our optimization aims at 
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transfer of data from vehicles to RSUs with an area coverage constraint. Also, we do not consider 
V2V communication in our optimization problem. 
The work is also related to the problem of facility location, where one or more facilities are 
optimally located in a region to reduce the overall costs (to consumer and facility) [12, 13]. The work 
does not aim at minimizing the overall costs (reporting time of events) rather it aims at minimizing 
the average reporting time on each path/route basis; this need awareness to road topology. Further, 
It also incorporates vehicle speed, vehicle density, probability of a vehicle to follow a particular route 
and event distribution. 
5.2 Optimal Placement of RSUs along Highways 
Given a limited number of RSUs, the section addresses the issue of optimal placement of these 
RSUs along highways with the goal of minimizing the average time taken for a vehicle to report an 
event of interest to a nearby RSU. One obvious solution is to uniformly distribute the available 
RSUs along the highway. This solution may be effective where the need of information 
collection/dissemination is uniform along the whole road range of a highway, which may not always 
be the case. For example, if we are interested in collection of information about road conditions 
such as fog or ice, then some areas will always be more likely to have a fog or an ice condition than 
the other areas. Finding the optimal solution via exhaustively checking all possible placement 
strategies will become infeasible with the increase of the number of RSUs, e.g., on a 100Km highway 
we can have approximately 200 candidate locations for RSUs (if RSU communication range is 250m 
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and an RSU can only deployed after every 2x250m), and if we need to place 20 RSUs among these 
locations then there will be 1.61 x 1027 different placement strategies.  
We present a balloon optimization method (that uses balloon expansion analogy to find optimal 
solution) and have compared it with an analytical optimization method (that uses brute force to find 
optimal solution). We incorporate vehicle speed, vehicle density and the likelihood of occurrence of 
an incident/event in our optimization scheme. Our optimization goal is to minimize the average 
reporting time for all possible information reports in a local region; reporting time is defined as the 
time duration from occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The proposed 
optimization scheme can easily be extended to applications that disseminate information, here the 
optimization goal can be the area covered within some time bounds. 
5.2.1 System Model 
The scope of this section is restricted to optimal placement of RSUs along one single highway. Let L 
be the length of a highway and R be the communication range of an RSU/vehicle. If RSUs can only 
be deployed after every 2xR distance then there will be   ⌊      ⌋ candidate locations. If M is 
the number of available RSUs then we aim at placing these M RSUs among N locations such that 
the average reporting time T(X) is minimized. X={x1, x2,.., xM} and xi is the location of RSUi. 
The density and speed of vehicles along the highway is denoted by d(x) and s(x) respectively, where 0 
≤ x ≤ L. For simplicity we consider a constant density D and constant speed S. If vehicles entering 
the highway follow Poisson distribution then there will be λ = SD vehicles entering the highway per 
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unit time. If y is the location of an incident/event that needs to be reported to RSU systems, a 
vehicle will reach the point of incident with an exponentially distributed time (mean value is 1/λ). 
Let f(x) define the distribution function of incidents/events along the highway. In order to simplify 
evaluation, we have considered f(x) such that the locations of optimal RSUs can be derived 
intuitively (the three scenarios shown in Figure 5.1). 
 
(a)      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.1: Incident/event distribution functions. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair 
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5.2.2 Simple (Analytical) Optimization 
If an RSU is located at position x, then for an incident/event that happened at place y, the reporting 
time t(x|y) is the summation of the time for a vehicle to arrive at y (denoted as ty) and the time for 
the vehicle to reach x from y (denoted as ty→x ), see Equation 5.1. If density and speed for vehicles in 
both directions are same then the average reporting time will be given by Equation 5.2.  
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 (5.1) 




For M=1 (single RSU placement problem), T(x) for all possible locations of the single RSU is shown 
in Figure 5.2. The optimal position of the RSU should have the minimum T(x). For M=2, optimal 
positions of the two RSUs are shown in Figure 5.3. 
5.2.3 Balloon Optimization 
In this optimization method RSUs are considered as balloons, where the balloon boundaries 
represent the coverage area of an RSU. Let a and b be the balloon boundaries of an RSU such that 0 
≤ a ≤ b ≤ L. The average reporting time for each side is considered independently; Ta(x) and Tb(x) 
for side bounded by a and b respectively, and their formulas are: 
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Figure 5.2: T(x) (Simple method) for M=1. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair 
 


























































           
(a)      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.3: Optimal RSU positions (Simple method) for M=2. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair 
Initially, RSUs are positioned uniformly along the highway, with a=b=x and Ta(x)=Tb(x)=0. In each 
optimization iteration, the T(x) on both sides of each balloon is incremented by a small value; each 
balloon is then expanded independently on both sides (i.e., a and b are increased) such that the 
computed value of T(x) on both sides equals the newly incremented value. Note that the expansion 
of a balloon on both sides may not be uniform. For example, the side with lower values of f(x) will 
expand more. The process is repeated till the balloon touches another RSU/balloon or the highway 
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boundary. The expanded balloons are then repositioned such that each balloon is equidistant from 
other balloons or highway boundaries (in a similar way like multiple balloons bounce with each 
other in a constrained space). The process is then repeated all over again. The process continues till 
there is no more space for expansion of balloons. The position of RSUs at this point is the optimal 
solution. Optimal RSU positions for M=1 and M=2 are shown in Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. 
     
(a)      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.4: Optimal RSU positions (Balloon method) for M=1. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair 
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(a)      (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.5: Optimal RSU positions (Balloon method) for M=2. (a) Flat (b) Step (c) Stair 
5.2.4 Discussion 
As shown in Figure 5.1, three different distributions of f(x) were especially chosen so that the 
optimal positions of RSUs are intuitive. Figure 5.2 and 5.4 show optimal positions for M=1 and 
Figure 5.3 and 5.5 show optimal positions for M=2. The simple (analytical) optimization method 
finds optimal placement after exhaustively going through all the possible options (see Figure 5.2) 
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and will thus be uneconomical for long highways or a large number of RSUs. Balloon optimization 
heuristics on the other hand is much simpler and less complex. The optimal positions from both the 
optimization methods closely match with each other and are also intuitive. 
5.3 Optimal Placement of RSUs in Urban Areas 
We present two different solutions to the RSUs placement problem with objective of maximizing 
the information flow from vehicles to RSUs in an urban environment: Binary Integer Programming 
(BIP) method and a novel Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) method. BIP method utilizes branch 
and bound method to find optimal solution, whereas, BEH method uses balloon expansion analogy 
to find optimal solution. We have incorporated the vehicle density, vehicle speed, and the 
occurrence likelihood of an incident/event in our optimization schemes. We present two separate 
algorithms, based on different optimization goals, for each method. One algorithm aims at 
minimizing the reporting time for a given number of RSUs; reporting time is defined as the time 
duration from occurrence of an event till it is reported by a vehicle to an RSU. The other algorithm 
aims at minimizing the number of RSUs required for deployment for a given reporting timing 
constraint. Our proposed optimization schemes can easily be extended to applications that depend 
on information flow from infrastructure to vehicles where the optimization goal can be area covered 
within some reporting time bounds. 
The scope of this part is restricted to urban environment such as the one shown in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6(a) shows a partial map of Miami, FL, USA. The map shows a grid of major roads (shown 
in yellow and red color) and a number of smaller/local streets. The major roads are shared by all 
138 
users/buses for commuting whereas the smaller streets are used only by users who need to visit a 
particular home or business on that street. The traffic on smaller streets is therefore very 
small/negligible as compared to that on major roads and we can safely ignore these for our system 
model. Figure 5.6(a) can be approximated to a grid network of roads as shows in Figure 5.6(b) after 
removing the local/smaller streets.  
5.3.1 Optimization Problem Modeling 
5.3.1.1 System Model 
Consider the road network (shown in Figure 5.6(b)) as a graph with each intersection as a vertex and 
each road segment as an edge. V is set of all vertices, let i  V (or vi  V). E is set of all edges, let j 
E (or ej  E). Each road segment is further divided into many smaller sub-segments (each of length 
  ) M is the set of all such sub-segments in the complete road network, let k M (or mk  M). For a 
sub-segment k  M, let dk be the vehicle density (vehicles/Km), fk be the event/incident frequency 
(number of events happened in a given time – frequency of events) and sk be the vehicle speed 
(Km/hr). The densities and speed on all sub-segments k  ej cannot always be the same because of 
different surface conditions (bumpy, slippery, etc), different gradient (steep climb, uphill, downhill, 
etc), different geometry (curving, straight, etc) and proximity to road signals or stop signs etc. 
Simplified event/incident distributions were considered to ease evaluation.  
The event/incident distribution functions for the road network of Figure 5.6(b) that will be 
evaluated in this chapter are shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.7(a) shows a distribution where the 
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likelihood of an event/incident changes from one road to another but is constant over one 
particular road. This can be the case when roads have different characteristics such as road widths, 
speed limits, vehicle densities, and neighborhoods. Figure 5.7(b) shows a distribution where the 
likelihood of an event/incident, in addition to changing from one road to another road, also changes 
over every road. This corresponds to the more realistic scenario where events/incidents are more 
likely to happen around intersections than in the road sub-segments that are far away from 
intersections.  
If vehicles entering the region follow Poisson distribution then there will be λk = sk dk vehicles 
entering the sub-segment k  M (or mk  M) per unit time. If y (y M) is the location of an 
incident/event then a vehicle will reach the point of incident with an exponentially distributed time, 
with an average value of 1/λy. If x (x V) is the location of an RSU, then the reporting time, t(x,y) 
(time for a vehicle to report an incident happened at location y to an RSU at location x) will be the 
summation of the time for a vehicle to reach location y (ty) and the time for the vehicle to reach x 






Figure 5.6: Urban environment. (a) Partial map of Miami, FL, USA. © OpenStreetMap contributors, 
CC-BY-SA (b) Grid-road network approximation of Figure 5.4(a). 
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Figure 5.7: Event/incident distribution functions: Relative frequency of events (z axis) at each 
segment (x-y axes). (a) Stair (b) Wave 
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(       )
      (5.4) 
where pyx is the probability that a vehicle at y M will travel to xV. 
If there are more than one paths/routes from y to x, as will be the case in urban environment, then 
in Equation 5.4     should represent the average time taken by any vehicle at y M to travel to x 
V along all the possible routes. Its value is given by Equation 5.5. 
    ∑         (5.5) 
where z is the number of possible routes from y M to x V, Dz is the fraction of vehicles 
travelling from y M to x V that use route z and tyxz is the time for the vehicle to reach x  V from 
y M using route z. 
Let N, n N, be the set of sub-segments forming a route from y M to x V. The average 
reporting for any event/incident along this route is given by Equation 5.6. If a route contains more 
than one sub-routes then we can use either the average travelling times (as given by Equation 5.5) or 
just the most direct/shortest route. 
      
∑    |       




Figure 5.8: Reporting Time of an incident/event 
5.3.1.2 Optimization Problem Modeling 
Let C be the total number of sub-segments in a road network, i.e., n(M)=C and R be the total 
number of intersections in a road network, i.e., n(V)=R (we use notation n(A) for number of 
elements in set A). Each intersection is a candidate location for an RSU. If r is the desired number 
of RSUs, τ is the desired average reporting time and α is the desired fraction of coverage in the road 
network (m=αC is the number of covered sub-segments), then the two optimization problems can 
be stated as follows: 
 Minimize the average reporting time: Minimize the average reporting time over each 
route (or an upper bound on the average reporting time over any route) such that at most r 
RSUs are placed among R candidate locations of set V and at least m out of C sub-
segments of set M are covered by these RSUs. 
 Minimize the number of RSUs: Minimize the number of RSUs placed among R 
candidate locations of set V such that at least m out of C sub-segments of set M are 
covered within τ average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average 






5.3.1.3 Problem Complexity 
One possible optimization option is to exhaustively check all possible combinations to find an 
optimal solution. The number of possible combinations for optimization problem 1 and 2 are given 
by Equation 5.7 and Equation 5.8 respectively. The solutions that check all possible combinations to 
find an optimal solution increasingly become inefficient with the increase in size of area/region. For 
a 10Km x 10Km urban area with a grid-road topology, we may have a total road length of 100Km 
and 25 intersections. For a sub-segment size of 250m, we will have a total of 400 sub-segments. If 
we want to minimize the average reporting time for a total of r=5 RSUs and α=0.8 (80%) coverage, 
the number of possible combinations will be 1.15 x 10313. And, if we want to minimize the number 
of RSUs (≤ 9) for some average reporting time and 80% coverage, the number of possible 
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) is combinations that gives the number of subsets with size m when picking from a larger 
set of size C, and { 
 
} is the Stirling numbers of the second kind that gives the number of ways to partition 
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5.3.2 Optimization Schemes 
5.3.2.1 Binary Integer Programming (BIP) Optimization 
The linear programming formalizations are not aware of the road topology so we need to relax the 
condition of the average reporting time that is defined over a single path/route to the average 
reporting time defined over entire region. The two performance metrics are not the same but the 
relaxation helps us to solve the optimization problem analytically using linear programming. It is 
important to note that averaging over entire region is more relaxed; it may include some routes 
whose average reporting time will be greater than the average reporting time over the entire region. 
M is the set of all sub-segments in the road network, let (k M); and V is the set of all intersections 
(candidate RSU locations), let (i V). Let Nk be the number of incidents happening on any sub-
segment k M and Aki be the reporting time of an incident at sub-segment k M to an RSU i V. 
Let yi  and xki  be two binary decision variable; such that, yi  equals to 1 if RSU i V exists and 0 
otherwise and xki equals to 1 if sub-segment k M is covered by RSU i V and 0 otherwise. The 
two optimization problem formulizations are as follows: 
5.3.2.1.1 Minimize the Average Reporting Time (BIP-I) 
 The optimization goal is to minimize the average reporting time for a given number of RSUs and 
area coverage. As discussed earlier, we have relaxed the minimization of the average reporting time 
over each route constraint and replaced it with the average reporting time over the entire region. 
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Specifically, here we minimize the total reporting time over the entire region. The binary integer 
programming formalization of this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.9. 
 
Figure 5.9: Formulization BIP-I: Minimizing total reporting time f(r) for given r number of RSUs 
and α area coverage. For 100% coverage, the constraints are (1) to (5); for 100α percentage of 
coverage, the constraints are (1), (2b), (3), (4), (5) and (6). 
Constraint (1) requires that the number of RSUs should be less than or equal to the desired value (r). 
Constraint (2) requires that each sub-segment is assigned to one or more than one RSUs, this 
ensures 100% coverage. Constraint (3) ensures that sub-segments are assigned to only those RSUs 
that are included in the solution. Constraints (2b and 6) replace constraint (2) if the required 
coverage is less than 100% coverage but equal to or greater than some coverage threshold (given by 
αC). 
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5.3.2.1.2 Minimize the Number of RSUs (BIP-II) 
 The optimization goal is to minimize the total number of RSUs for given average reporting time 
and area coverage. Average reporting time over each route has been relaxed to average reporting 
time over entire region/area. The binary integer programming formalization of this problem is given 
in Figure 5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: Formulization BIP-II: Minimizing total number of RSUs f(τ) for given τ reporting time 
(average reporting time over the entire region) and α area coverage. For 100% coverage, the 
constraints are (1) to (5); for 100α percentage of coverage, the constraints are (1), (2b), (3), (4), (5) 
and (6). 
Constraint (1) requires that the average reporting time over entire region is less than or equal to the 
average reporting time threshold (τ). Constraint (2) requires that each sub-segment is assigned to one 
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or more than one RSUs, this ensures 100% coverage, i.e., all sub-segments are assigned to some 
RSU. Constraint (3) ensures that sub-segments are assigned to only those RSUs that are included in 
the solution. Constraints (2b and 6) replace constraint (2) if the required coverage is less than 100% 
coverage but equal to or greater than some coverage threshold (given by αC). 
5.3.2.2 Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) Optimization 
In this optimization, each RSU and its coverage area is considered as a balloon that dynamically 
expands in a two dimensional space. A balloon’s boundary represents the area covered by an RSU 
within a given average reporting time. The balloons are dynamically expanded as we gradually relax 
the average reporting time constraint till the desired percentage/fraction of area is covered by them. 
The roads inside a balloon’s boundary at any time include all the segments that can be covered by 
the RSU within some average reporting time via some route/path. The balloon expansion follows 
road network and the expansion is independent on each side, that is, if the RSU is located at an 
intersection then the balloon boundary on each of the four sides will expand independent of other 
three sides. The expansion depends on vehicle speed, vehicle density, event/incident distribution 
and probability of vehicles following a route. The segments, along a route, with high frequency of 
events/incidents will have more impact on computing the average reporting time than those with 
low frequency of events. 
Figure 5.11 shows a road intersection where an RSU is located; A, B, C, and D is the balloon 
boundary for some average reporting time (τ). Initially, |XA|=|XB|=|XC|=|XD|=0, i.e., points 
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{A, B, C, D} are located at X and T(x,a)=T(x,b)=T(x,c)=T(x,d)=0, where T(x,y) is the average reporting time 
along path XY including point Y. The balloon is then expanded independently on all four routes for 
some average reporting time (τ). The size of expansion on each route will vary depending on vehicle 
speed, vehicle density, incident/event distribution and probability of vehicles following a route. 
Figure 5.11 shows a balloon expansion where |XA|=|XD|≤|XC|≤|XB|. 
 
Figure 5.11: Balloon expansion: The expansion is independent along each direction and depends on 
vehicle speed, vehicle density, event/incident distribution and probability of vehicles following a 
route. |XA|,|XD|,|XC|, and |XB| give the size of expansion towards A, B, C and D respectively 
for τ average reporting time over each route. 
Unrestricted expansions may form loops especially in urban environment. In order to avoid loops, 
we assume that the boundary expansion of an RSU is towards the direction away from the RSU; if 
the expansion encounters an intersection then it only continues in directions that are away from the 
RSU. Figure 5.12 gives the average reporting times for an RSU located at the center of an urban 














Figure 5.12: Average reporting times, for different event/incident distributions, of urban 
environment given at Figure 5.6(b). (a) Stair (b) Wave 
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BEH optimization method, in general, starts with placing an RSU at each candidate location. The 
coverage of each RSU is then expanded on each side (along each route) for some value of average 
response time. The expansion continues till a sufficient number of sub-segments are covered by 
more than one neighboring RSUs (or the average reporting time threshold has reached). At this 
moment, the RSU with the least “impact factor” is removed (similar to the bursting of a balloon due 
to the too tight compression from neighboring balloons). The process repeats until the optimization 
objective is achieved. The impact factor of an RSU is the number of sub-segments that will not be 
covered if the RSU is removed; it is computed by subtracting the number of overlapped-sub-
segments (sub-segments that are covered by this RSU and also by some other RSUs) from the 
number of sub-segments covered by this RSU. 
5.3.2.2.1 Minimize the Average Reporting Time (BEH-I) 
The BEH algorithm for this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.13. The optimization 
objective is to minimize the average reporting time over each route (or the upper bound on average 
reporting time over any route) for given number of RSUs (r) and area coverage (αC). The method 
starts with placing an RSU at each candidate location (line 2), the average reporting time (of each 
route) is then iteratively incremented by a small value (line 5-8) until area coverage constraint is met 
(line 9-10). The impact factor of each RSU is calculated (line 11-13) and the one with the least 
impact factor (line 14-15) is removed provided the removal does not affect area coverage constraint 
(line 16-19); otherwise the average reporting time (of each route) will be further incremented (line 5-
8). The process continues until the number of RSU constraint is met (line 4). 
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Figure 5.13: Algorithm BEH-I: Minimizing average reporting time over each route (i.e., the upper 
bound on average reporting time over any route) for given number of RSUs and area coverage. 
After the algorithm finishes, τ' gives the upper bound on the average reporting time over any route. 
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5.3.2.2.2 Minimize the number of RSUs (BEH-II) 
BEH algorithm for this optimization problem is given in Figure 5.14. The optimization objective is 
to minimize the number of RSUs for a given average reporting time over each route (or an upper 
bound on the average reporting time over any route) (τ) and area coverage (αC). The method starts 
with placing an RSU at each candidate location (line 2). The coverage balloons of all the RSUs are 
then expanded till the average response time is equal to the desired value (line 4-6). The combined 
coverage is checked against desired coverage (line 7-9). The impact factor of each RSU is calculated 
(line 13-15) and the one with the least impact factor (line 16-17) is removed provided that the 
removal does not affect area coverage constraint (line 18-19, 11-12). Impact factors are then 
recalculated and a fresh sorted list is generated. The process stops when removing an RSU will 




Figure 5.14: Algorithm BEH-II: Minimizing the total number of RSUs for given average reporting 
time over each route (i.e., the upper bound on average reporting time over any route) and area 
coverage 
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5.3.3 Simulation Results and Discussion 
5.3.3.1 Simulation Setup 
The simulation is based on an urban region with five vertical and five horizontal roads, as shown in 
Figure 5.6(b). The region is 3 Km x 3 Km, with a total road length of 30 Km. The sub-segment size 
is 250m, resulting in a total of 120 sub-segments. There are a total of 25 intersections; in order to 
reduce problem complexity for BIP methods (explained earlier), only 9 out of the 25 intersections 
are considered as candidate locations for RSUs (refer Figure 5.6(b)). Two different incident/event 
distributions are defined, as shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.7(a) shows a distribution where the 
likelihood of an event/incident changes from one road to another but is constant over one 
particular road. This can be the case when roads have different characteristics such as road widths, 
speed limits, vehicle densities, and neighborhoods. Figure 5.7(b) shows a distribution where the 
likelihood of an event/incident, in addition to changing from one road to another road, also changes 
over every road. This corresponds to the more realistic scenario where events/incidents are more 
likely to happen around intersections than in the road sub-segments that are far away from 
intersections. 
Vehicles entering the region follow Poisson distribution, with λ=SD vehicles entering any sub-
segment per unit time. A constant vehicle density of D = 4vehicle/Km and a constant speed of S = 
50Km/hr is assumed for this simulation. The probability that a vehicle at a point of event/incident 
will travel to a particular RSU is considered to be inversely proportional to the number of 
intersections (or routes) between the vehicle and the RSU. The most direct and shortest path is used 
to calculate the reporting time of an event/incident to a particular RSU; only the vehicles following 
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that route are considered in computing the average reporting time and the contribution by the rest 
of vehicles for reporting the event/incident is ignored (which, if considered, may improve the 
event/incident reporting likelihood). It is important to note that in real scenarios/applications 
vehicle traces can be used to generate all these statistics; the statistics based on vehicle traces are 
generally reliable as daily traffic patterns are often repeated. 
In order to study how well our proposed optimization methods perform, enumeration method was 
used to exhaustively search for the true optimal solution. As discussed earlier, enumeration method 
increasingly becomes inefficient with the increase in size of area/region. In order to reduce the 
number of combinations to be checked to find an optimal solution, so that we can actually finish the 
enumerating operation using personal computers, the average reporting time over each route 
constraint was relaxed and was replaced with the average reporting time over the entire region. With 
this relaxation, we can simply consider a segment to be covered by one RSU (out of all the currently 
considered RSUs) that has minimum reporting time from that segment instead of considering all of 
RSUs. 
The specifications of system used for simulation are: Processor - Intel® CoreTM2 Quad CPU Q6700 




5.3.3.2.1 Enumeration/Exhaustive Search 
The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs, using 
enumeration/exhaustive search for different event/incident distributions of urban environment 
given at Figure 5.6(b), are shown in Figure 5.15. The result covers all possible number of RSUs, 
refer Equation 5.8, therefore it can be used to find the minimum number of RSUs required for a 
given average reporting time (over the entire region). For example, as shown in Figure 5.15, a 
minimum of 5 RSUs will be required for an average reporting time of 150 sec. 
 
Figure 5.15: Minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs 
using enumeration/ exhaustive search for different event/incident distributions of urban 
environment given at Figure 5.6(b). 
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5.3.3.2.2 Binary Integer Programming (BIP) Optimization 
The optimal placements of RSUs for minimizing the total reporting time for different numbers of 
RSUs (BIP-I) are shown in Figure 5.16. 
           
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 5.16: Optimal RSU placements using BIP-I (minimizing total reporting time for given 
number of RSUs and area coverage): (a) Number of RSUs = 3 (b) Number of RSUs = 6 (c) Number 
of RSUs = 8 
The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs, using 
BIP-I for different event/incident distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, is shown 
in Figure 5.17. The minimum average reporting time over the entire region of BIP-I is the same as 
that of enumeration/exhaustive search solution.  
The minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average reporting 
time over any route) for different number of RSUs, corresponding to optimal solutions of BIP-I for 
different event/incident distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure 
5.18. The minimum average reporting time over each path of BIP-I is higher than that of BEH-I. 
The execution times for BIP-I is given in Figure 5.21.  
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Optimal placement of RSUs for minimizing the total number of RSUs (BIP-II) did not converge to a 





Figure 5.17: Minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs 







Figure 5.18: Minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average 
reporting time over any route) for different event/incident distributions of urban environment given 
at Figure 5.6 (b). (a) Stair (b) Wave 
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5.3.3.2.3 Balloon Expansion Heuristic (BEH) Optimization 
The optimal placements of RSUs for minimizing the average response time over each route (or an 
upper bound on the average reporting time over any route) for different numbers of RSUs (BEH-I) 
are shown in Figure 5.19. 
The minimum average reporting time over each route (or an upper bound on the average reporting 
time over any route) for different number of RSUs, using BEH-I for different event/incident 
distributions of urban environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure 5.18. The minimum 
average reporting time over each path achieved by BEH-I is better than that of BIP-I. 
           
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 5.19: Optimal RSU placements using BEH-I (minimizing average reporting time over each 
route, or an upper bound on the average reporting time over any route, for given number of RSUs 
and area coverage): (a) Number of RSUs = 3 (b) Number of RSUs = 6 (c) Number of RSUs = 8 
The minimum average reporting time (over the entire region) for different number of RSUs, 
corresponding to optimal solutions of BEH-I for different event/incident distributions of urban 
environment given at Figure 5.6, are shown in Figure 5.17. The minimum average reporting time 
over the entire region achieved by BEH-I closely follows that of enumeration/exhaustive search. 
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The optimal placement of RSUs for minimizing number of RSUs for different reporting times 
(BEH-II) is shown in Figure 5.20. The execution times for both the BEH algorithms are given in 
Figure 5.21 and 5.22. 
           
(a)    (b)    (c) 
Figure 5.20: Optimal RSU placements using BEH-II (minimizing total number of RSUs for given 
average reporting time over each route and area coverage) : (a) Average Reporting time ≤ 180 secs 
(b) Average Reporting time ≤ 150 secs (c) Average Reporting time ≤ 130 secs 
 
Figure 5.21: Execution times for BEH-I and BIP-1 for different number of desired RSUs 
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5.3.3.3 Discussion 
BIP-I successfully produced optimal solutions. The minimum average reporting time over the entire 
region is the same as that of enumeration/exhaustive search (Figure 5.17). However, the minimum 
average reporting time over each path is higher than that of BEH-I (Figure 5.18).  
 
Figure 5.22: Execution times for BEH-II for different average reporting times 
BIP-II did not produce feasible solution within reasonable time. BIP optimizations use branch and 
bound algorithm to solve the problems; the branch and bound algorithm uses binary search tree 
whose size grows tremendously with the increase in size of a problem. The failure of BIP-II to 
converge within reasonable time may be due to reason that, in worst cases, branch and bound 
algorithm searches all possible combinations to find the best solution [2] and we have already shown 
in section 5.3.1.3 that the number of possible combinations for this problem is very large (>10122). 
One possible solution is to iteratively use BIP-I to solve BIP-II. The BIP-II optimization problem 
can be restated as: Find the smallest number of RSUs satisfying the average reporting time 
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constraint (τ). A simple way is to repeatedly use BIP-I, with decreasing numbers of RSUs, to find the 
smallest number of RSUs that gives a minimum reporting time satisfying the timing constraint. The 
number of BIP-I computations can be reduced by employing various search methods such as binary 
search. The binary-search based algorithm is listed in the Figure 5.23. 
 
Figure 5.23: Algorithm BIP-II.I (Using Binary search and BIP-I): Minimizing total number of RSUs 
for a given average reporting time constraint and area coverage 
BEH algorithms incorporate the knowledge of road topology to find the optimal solution. Both the 
BEH algorithms successfully produced optimal solutions. The execution times for both the BEH 
methods are much less than that of BIP-I method (refer Figure 5.21 and 5.22). 
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In addition, the minimum average reporting time over each path achieved by BEH is better than 
that of BIP-I (Figure 5.18). The minimum average reporting time over the entire region achieved by 
BEH closely follows that of enumeration/exhaustive search (Figure 5.17).  
BEH-I removes RSUs as it increments the average reporting time. The selection of an RSU to be 
removed, at any stage, may vary with the size of average reporting time increment. A smaller 
increment size gives higher resolution on minimum average reporting time, whereas a larger 
increment size may result in more global optimization. BEH-I removes RSUs after incrementing the 
average reporting time to the desired threshold. It then greedily removes RSUs with the least impact 
factors; this RSU removal can also be modeled as a knapsack problem [14], in future work, for more 
fine grained solutions. 
The RSU removal sequence, in both the BEH algorithms, may later be utilized for incrementally 
deploying RSUs. BEH algorithms provide the optimal RSU placement for a given (or minimum) 
number of RSUs, later if we want to add more RSUs to the region, then they can be deployed at 
locations that were removed last. BEH-I can also be used to find marginal improvement in average 
reporting time for each added RSUs. 
BEH algorithms use average reporting time over a path as a timing constraint. Average reporting time 
over a path is more useful metric then average reporting time over entire region; it guarantees that 
on average an event/incident will be reported within the timing constraint whereas the average 
reporting time over entire region cannot guarantee this. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
We have presented an optimization schemes for two different environments: along highways and in 
urban areas. For highways, the optimization aims to minimize the average reporting time of an 
event/incident by a vehicle to a nearby RSU. Our optimization scheme is based on balloon 
expansion analogy, where the expansion in each direction is related to vehicle speed, vehicle density 
and likelihood of incidents/events. We have shown that our balloon optimization scheme performs 
equally well as the exhaustive optimization scheme. For urban areas, we have presented two 
optimization methods: Binary Integer Programming (BIP) method and Balloon Expansion Heuristic 
(BEH) method. Both optimization methods were used to solve two optimization problems: 
minimizing the average reporting time and minimizing the number of required RSUs. We have 
shown that the novel BEH method is more versatile and can be used to solve both the optimization 
problems without any further relaxations. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 
Need of ubiquitous connectivity has brought connectivity to vehicles, resulting in formation of 
VANET. A lot of work has been done in this area and various applications, protocols and standards 
have been developed. Most of the applications and services assume a mature VANET with 
pervasive roadside infrastructure and large number of smart vehicles. But, during the initial 
deployment stages of VANET there will be very scarce roadside infrastructure and very limited 
number of smart vehicles on the road. Therefore, in order to bootstrap VANET and make VANET 
an attractive investment for both the service providers and consumers there is a need to develop 
various solutions that do not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or a large number of 
vehicles. We have proposed various solutions that are viable even with very scarce roadside 
infrastructure and very limited number of smart vehicles. These solutions are economical, scalable, 
and deployable and will help in stimulating VANET activity and its adoption. 
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized below.  
 Design of a VANET architecture that does not need expensive roadside infrastructure or 
large number of smart vehicles, can provide services with limited number of heterogeneous 
roadside units and smart vehicles with varying capabilities, is scalable and deployable. 
 Provision of backend connectivity to Internet to smart vehicles without requiring pervasive 
roadside infrastructure or large number of smart vehicles, especially in rural areas and along 
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highways. Satellite down-only link is incorporated to provide connectivity during long 
intervals between RSUs. 
 Design of security architecture that does not depend on pervasive roadside infrastructure or 
a fully connected V2V network. The architecture is economical, scalable and deployable. 
Two architectures have been proposed: a service oriented and a general purpose. Both 
architectures fulfill the security requirements. 
 Optimal placement of limited number of RSUs within a given area to provide best possible 
service to smart vehicles. The optimal placement solution covers both environments: the 
urban areas and the highways. A novel heuristic optimization solution has been proposed 
that performs near optimal results without needing extensive resources as that required by 
exhaustive search optimization solutions.  
 
